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The more computers are integrated into all aspects of daily life, the more likely 
citizens are to be victims of cyber-crime.  In order to combat cyber-crime, computer 
scientists are continuing to learn how to defend against attacks and attackers.  For 
several years, the Black Hat organization, as part of its annual DEFCON convention in 
Las Vegas, began holding an annual Capture the Flag (CTF) cyber-exercise.  This 
exercise serves as a test bed for computer attack and defense techniques. [DEF01] 
In addition to cyber-crime affecting the private citizen, cyber-attacks are also a 
real and present threat against the United States government, more specifically against 
the Department of Defense.  In recent years, there has been a marked increase in 
attacks against DoD computers [LEW01] and direct threats against the United States 
by terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.  [VER02] 
Many governmental personnel charged with the defense of DoD computer 
systems practice, perfect, and validate their cyber-defense techniques against other 
teams at the DEFCON CTF competition.  The DEFCON CTF, although an excellent 
exercise, is held on site at Las Vegas.  All participants must travel there to participate.  
The information assurance community could benefit from more frequent training in 
cyber attack and defense training.  This is especially true in academic circles.  In order 
to comply with the geographic and temporal demands of academic institutions, cyber-
exercises are moving toward being conducted over long distances.  Each team operates 
from is own location, connected through the Internet. 
Conducting cyber-exercises over long distances presents several challenges.  
On one hand, the academic network of each participant contributing to the exercise 
needs to be protected from outside attack.  Though protecting any network is always a 
smart thing to do, having a cyber-exercise network vulnerable, or even able to be 
observed, by outside hackers adds an unwanted, uncontrolled dimension to the 
otherwise controlled exercise.  On the other hand, as genuine computer attacks are 
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being launched within the cyber-exercise, the public Internet at large must be protected 
from the techniques and technicians participating in the cyber-exercise.  Therefore 
cyber-exercises require dual protection, protecting the public from the cyber-exercise, 
and protecting the cyber-exercise players from the public.  Two techniques that can 
help are encrypted tunneling and internet protocol security (IPSec).  Each will be 
introduced here and discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. 
B. ENCRYPTED TUNNELING 
There are several possible solutions to the dual protection that is required when 
conducting a cyber-exercise.  Firewalls and password schemes might figure into 
protecting the integrity of the cyber-exercise, but the most complete way to isolate a 
cyber-exercise from the rest of the public Internet is through virtual private network 
(VPN) technology.  [MER99]  If properly constructed, a VPN can allow the cyber-
exercise to proceed unobserved and unmolested by non-participants, and can also 
protect the integrity and restrict participation in the cyber-exercise to only the invited 
participants. 
There are several possible ways to implement a VPN within the seven layer 
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) network model.  Current commonly accepted 
ways of VPN implementation are at the link layer (layer 2), at the network layer (layer 
3), or in the upper layers (layer 5, six and seven).  [MAI02]  The higher layer VPN, 
commonly called an “application layer” or “layer 5” VPN, takes into account that the 
application layer is layer 5 in the Department of Defense (DOD) network model.  
[FOR01] 
C. INTERNET PROTOCOL SECURITY (IPSEC) IMPLEMENTATION 
DECISIONS 
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) and how it works is at the very heart of 
understanding how a VPN operates.  IPSec is examined in great detail in this thesis.  
IPSec was designed to provide secure, reliable data transfer through the standardized 
use of many pre-existing protocols.  [THA98]  Besides choosing the best layer in 
which to implement the VPN, there are many other decisions relating to IPSec that 
must be consciously made for a VPN to be effective.  The proper key exchange 
method, security protocol, VPN mode, and gateway device must be chosen. 
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1. Key Exchanges 
The internet key exchange (IKE) protocol provides the method for creation of a 
secure tunnel between two VPN peers.  The creation of this tunnel is a complex 
process involving up to four internet protocols that are captured by the IKE parent 
protocol.  [MAI02] 
The building of the secure tunnel for a VPN takes place in two phases, titled 
IKE phase I and IKE phase II.  During IKE phase I, an authenticated secure channel 
between the VPN peers is constructed.  During phase II, the IPSec parameters are 
negotiated to allow the secure transfer of data. 
It is perhaps worth reminding the reader that this VPN tunnel is not an actual 
(physical) “tunnel” but rather a virtual tunnel.  The contents of the traffic, due to the 
proper employment of encryption, cannot be observed or surreptitiously modified.  
Thus the traffic is considered “tunneled”, or hidden/protected. 
2. Security Protocol 
There are two choices of security protocol when using IPSec, authentication 
header (AH) and encapsulating security payload (ESP).  The AH protocol is designed 
to provide integrity, authentication, and replay protection for the processed datagram.  
ESP provides all these features also, and through the use of encryption, offers 
confidentiality as well.  [MAI02] 
3. Security Mode 
IPSec can be run in one of two modes, either transport mode or tunnel mode.  
Transport mode can only be used when the VPN gateway device is also the VPN client 
device; i.e. the user of the VPN tunnel is also the provider of the VPN tunnel.  Tunnel 
mode allows the VPN gateway device to be placed in front of a network of computers.  
All computers on this network can then utilize the VPN tunnel, provided by the 
gateway device operating in tunnel mode.   
4. Gateway Device 
The final decision to be made regarding implementing a cyber-exercise VPN is 
exactly what physical devices will best perform the technical processes delineated 
above.  There are three generalized choices.  VPNs can be constructed with a general-
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purpose computer running VPN software.  VPNs can be constructed using a VPN-
capable router.  Finally, VPNs can be constructed using a dedicated VPN device, often 
called a VPN concentrator or VPN appliance. 
D. FOCSU AND DIRECTION OF THIS RESEARCH 
The focus of this thesis is VPN creation.  This thesis will first provide the 
reader with a thorough examination of the underlying theory and structure of a VPN.  
Then using the theory learned, commercially available hardware will be used to 
construct actual working VPNs that ultimately link networks and cyber-exercises.  
Knowledge gained through detailed examination and implementation of VPNs will 
benefit the DoD by increasing knowledge about the requirements and structure of 
VPN technology, as well as the benefits derived from participation in the cyber-
exercises that result from the linking of two networks via VPN. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:   
Chapter II. “Virtual Private Networks Explained” will look at cryptography, 
endpoint authentication, and the interaction of a VPN with the network layers. 
Chapter III. “IPSec Virtual Private Network Management” will examine in 
detail the workings of IPSec, digital certificates and the concept of split tunneling. 
Chapter IV. “Cyber-Exercise Needs” will discuss the unique concerns of a 
cyber-exercise VPN in relation to the detailed topics examined in the previous 
chapters. 
Chapter V.  “Three VPN Alternatives” wll examine, step by step, the building 
a VPN on commercially available hardware, relating the theoretical to the practical.    
Chapter VI.  “Summary and Conclusions” ties all points together and 
recommends an optimum VPN solution for a cyber-exercise. 
To begin this process, the basic components of a VPN must be understood.  A 
logical place to begin is with an examination of cryptography, endpoint authentication, 
and the interaction of a VPN with the network layers.  Chapter II examines each topic 
in detail. 
 5
II. VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS (VPNS) EXPLAINED 
In understanding how a virtual private network (VPN) is constructed, several 
items must be examined.  The role of cryptography, VPN endpoint authentication, and 
VPN interaction with the network structure must receive a careful look.  In this 
chapter, these essential topics will be examined in detail. 
A. CRYPTOGRAPHY: THE KEY TO PRIVACY 
The technique that makes a virtual private network “private” is the use of 
cryptography.  Cryptography, when combined with robust protocols, attempts to 
provide any or all of the three information security attributes: confidentiality, integrity, 
and authenticity.  In VPNs, confidentiality is concerned with ensuring that transmitted 
information is not able to be viewed by non-participants.  Integrity is concerned with 
the transmitted data being altered while enroute.  Authenticity is concerned with 
assuring the receiving party that the sender is indeed who they say they are.  VPNs 
make use of cryptography to address each of these concerns.  [FUL04] 
1. Hashing for Integrity and Authenticity 
Hashing is a component of cryptography that, when properly employed, is able 
to assure the receiver of a message that the message has not been altered.  In other 
words, hashing is a method to support data integrity.  Through the addition of a key, or 
any such form of a “shared secret”, hashing can also be used to ensure authenticity.  A 
one-way transform is an accurate description of how a hash algorithm functions.  It is 
important to point out that “hashing” is the one-way process of converting a message 
into a “hash”.  A hash is the resulting fixed length string of symbols.  The hash is also 
known as a message digest or a one-way transform.  Each type of hash function is 
based on a mathematical algorithm. 
No matter which hash algorithm is used, the hash algorithm is designed to 
provide integrity.  It does this by applying the hash algorithm to the message.  Any 
message, no matter how large or small, can be reduced in size to, in the case of well 
known hash functions, 128, 160, 172 or 256 bit string of symbols, or hash.  In the VPN 
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arena, there are two often used hash algorithms, the Message Digest 5 (MD5) and the 
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). 
The MD5 hash algorithm was designed by Professor Rivest of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1991.  It generates a 128 bit hash 
value.  Theoretically, all hash algorithms can be defeated.  Ideally; however, hash 
algorithms are created to be robust enough so that their defeat is, in a practical sense, 
not feasible.  Unfortunately in 1994, only three years after its introduction, laboratory 
experiments were successful in defeating MD5 by causing a “collision”. [ENC01]  
Researchers, given a particular target hash, were able to generate two messages that 
produced that hash.  The occurrence of a collision was a blow to MD5.  Though MD5 
was defeated in the laboratory, MD5 is not considered broken and is still widely used 
in real world applications, including the Cisco devices used in this thesis. 
The SHA was designed by the National Security Agency (NSA), and was first 
published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 1993 and 
was called the Secure Hash Standard.  Due to a security flaw, it was quickly 
withdrawn and republished in 1994 as the present SHA-1.  The SHA-1 is very secure. 
It takes the original message and produces a 160-bit hash.  As recently as 2000, NIST 
published three new SHA algorithms that are designed to work with the advanced 
encryption standard (AES).  [WIK01]   
In examining the future security of hash algorithms, in August 2004 Dr 
Xiaoyun Wang demonstrated that she could create collisions using MD5 starting with 
any initial hash value.  [WAN04]  Dr Wang also had successful attacks against other 
hash algorithms, including MD4, Hashing Algorithm with Variable Length of Output -
128 (HAVAL-128), and Rate Adaptive Compression with Error (RACE) Integrity 
Primitives Evaluation Message Digest (RIPEMD).  Currently SHA-1 remains secure, 
however this recent defeat of the other hash algorithms foreshadows that SHA-1 is one 
day likely to be defeated as well.  [MIL04] 
a. Hashing Keys or Data Alone 
Sending the key, or shared secret (i.e. the authentication material), and 
the data to the peer that makes up the other end of the VPN is the cornerstone of 
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establishing authenticity and ultimately ensuring data integrity.  As a user attempts to 
implement data integrity and authenticity through the use of a hash function, the 
dependent security relationship between the data and the key must be understood.  The 
key must be agreed upon prior to (i.e., “pre-shared”) the establishment of the VPN by 
users at both ends of the VPN.  Sending the data together with the hashed key does not 
guarantee integrity nor authenticity, since an attacker could easily replay the 
authenticating hash with different data. The flaw in this protocol arises from the fact 
that the data being authenticated is in no way inextricably “combined” with 
authenticating key. Thus hashing keys separately from the data they are intended to 
protect fails to provide authenticity or integrity protection against malicious data 
modification. The simple solution to the above is to hash both the key and the data 
together prior to transmission.  
b. Hashing Keys and Data Combined 
A better way to provide both integrity and authenticity through the use 
of the hash function is to apply the hash function to both the data and the key together 
as one entity.  [FUL04]  For example, Alice and Bob want to establish secure 
communication between them.  Alice and Bob agree on a shared secret, i.e. key or 
password, to use for their communication.  Alice has data she wishes to send to Bob.  
Unlike the scenario above where Alice applies the hash function to the keys and data 
separately, Alice instead combines the data and secret, and then applies the hash 
function.  Alice then sends the data and the hash of the combined data/secret to Bob.  
When Bob receives the transmission, he retrieves his copy of the stored shared secret, 
combines it with the data in the previously agreed upon way, and then applies the 
same hash function (just as Alice did before sending).  Bob then compares the 
resulting hash to the hash that Alice sent.  If they are the same, Bob knows that the 
data did not change and that the data came from Alice.  Thus the hash function applied 
in this manner provides both integrity and authenticity. 
c. Addition of Nonce (or Cookie) 
Another challenge is defeating the replay attack.  On a communications 
channel, a potential attacker could be watching the aforementioned exchange between 
Alice and Bob and could capture data that was sent.  The attacker could later replay 
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both the hash and data to Bob.  Since the hash contained the shared secret, Bob would 
think that this latest transmission came from Alice.  In reality it came from the 
attacker.  To prevent this, Alice can introduce a nonce into the process.  A nonce is a 
meaningless random value with certain properties.  Similar to the scenario above, 
every time Alice sends a message to Bob, Alice combines the message, the shared 
secret, and a new nonce value.  She then applies the hash algorithm and sends the hash 
as well as the data in a message to Bob. 
Bob receives the message, which consists of the hash and the data, and 
verifies that the nonce value has not been previously received from Alice.  If this is the 
case, the message is valid and is processed.  However, if the nonce has already been 
received, then Bob infers that this is a replay attack and discards the message. 
2. Encrypting to Provide Confidentiality 
So far, hashing functions have enabled VPN integrity and authenticity.  VPN 
confidentiality is provided through the use of encryption.  Encryption is used during, 
IKE phases one and two, and during the actual operation of the VPN.  During the 
actual operation of the VPN, exercise data being exchanged is encrypted. 
a. IKE SA: Phase I and Phase II 
During Internet Key Exchange (IKE) phase I, encryption is used to 
protect the identification information of the peers.  During IKE phase II, encryption is 
used to protect the key material payloads being exchanged between the peers.  
[DAV01]  In both cases, an encryption algorithm must be chosen for the IKE Security 
Association (IKE SA) encryption.  Use of these encryption algorithms ensures 
confidentiality.  The information cannot be viewed except by the VPN participants that 
need to view them. 
Commonly used encryption algorithms are the data encryption standard 
(DES), the triple-DES (3DES), and the advanced encryption standard (AES).  DES 
was developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and International Business 
Machines (IBM) during the 1970s.  It was adopted by the government as an official 
standard.  DES encryption, using a 56-bit key, is commonly accepted to be strong 
enough against a non-determined attacker.  As computers have become faster and 
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cheaper and thus computing power more accessible for brute force attacks, DES is no 
longer considered strong enough for sensitive information.  [BLA96]  NIST has 
proposed withdrawing DES from government use, although DES will still be used as a 
component of 3DES.  [JAC04] 
Instead of investing resources in a new encryption algorithm, 3DES 
leverages the existing mechanics of the DES algorithm by running it three consecutive 
times with two different keys.  This results in an increase in security.  3DES has an 
effective key length of 168-bits.  Brute force attacks against 3DES are currently 
considered infeasible.  The disadvantage of 3DES is that more computing power is 
required to encrypt and decrypt data.  If a VPN has a heavy traffic load, 3DES may not 
be able to provide an acceptable level of service. 
In a search for not only a secure but also a more efficient (i.e., less CPU 
and memory intensive) encryption algorithm, NIST wanted to develop a new, more 
efficient algorithm, the advanced encryption standard (AES).  The algorithm selected 
was based on the Rijndael (pronounced rain-doll) algorithm.  This algorithm was 
announced as the new AES in October 2000.  [SMI01]  Using 128, 192 or 256-bit 
keys, AES is to be an eventual replacement for DES and 3DES.  AES was designed to 
run faster than DES and 3DES and use fewer resources [DUN96, HAR00] while 
providing more security than 3DES.  [BEY02, LEN99]  The setup of the VPN tunnel 
is explained in greater detail in Chapter III.  The actual entry of the key into the VPN 
is graphically depicted in Chapter V.   
b. IPSec SA 
Once the VPN tunnel for data exchange is in place, the exercise traffic 
to be sent in the tunnel needs to be encrypted.  Selecting from the same pool of 
encryption algorithms above, the exercise data is encrypted.  It is not necessary to 
choose the same algorithm for the internet protocol security (IPSec) security 
association (SA) as was chosen for the internet key exchange (IKE) SA; however, the 
same concerns for security vs. efficiency apply.  Since the exercise data is encrypted, it 
cannot be read by an attacker since the attacker does not possess the required key. 
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B. AUTHENTICATION OF END POINTS 
Both of the VPN endpoints must be authenticated so that the VPN users are 
confident that the VPN peer at the other end of the tunnel is the intended source and 
destination of the information.  There are generally two distinct ways to achieve this 
form of remote authentication. One method involves mutual revelation of a shared 
secret (without revealing it to an eavesdropper), and the other involves the proof of 
possession of certificate signed by a trusted intermediary (i.e., a Certificate Authority, 
or CA). 
1. Pre-Shared Secret 
The simplest way to verify the identity of the peer is to see if the peer 
possesses the same shared secret as the VPN initiator.  One way to accomplish this is 
for the user to pick up the telephone and exchange a shared secret.  This provides, in 
effect, a password.  The other user enters this same password into the VPN peer’s 
configuration.  Possession of this pre-shared “symmetric” secret on both ends of the 
VPN tunnel allows the two VPN endpoints to authenticate each other and ultimately 
communicate.   
2. PKI Certificates  
A more intricate way to verify the identity of the peer is through the use of 
public key infrastructure (PKI) certificates.  Currently, PKI is not widely implemented.  
Eventually; however, it will be easier for a VPN peer at one endpoint to authenticate 
the other VPN peer via the peer’s PKI certificate than it will be to establish a pre-
shared secret, as previously described.  
C. LINK, APPLICATION, OR NETWORK LAYER 
A VPN is built within the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 7-Layer 
network model.  There are three generally accepted locations within the OSI seven 
layer model to implement a VPN.  It is possible to implement a secure sockets layer 
(SSL) VPN between the session layer and transport layer, resulting in a layer 5 VPN.  
It is possible to implement an internet protocol security (IPSec) VPN between the 
network layer and data link layer, resulting in a layer 3 VPN.  Finally, using either the 
layer 2 tunneling protocol (L2TP) or the point to point tunneling protocol (PPTP), a 
VPN can be built between the data link layer and the physical layer, resulting in a 
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layer 2 VPN.  All three of these potential VPN implementation locations share 
common features.  
Normal network traffic, as it passes down and up the OSI network stack, 
undergoes a process of encapsulation and de-capsulation respectively.  Upon 
generation, as data comes from a higher layer and is sent down into a lower layer, that 
data is encapsulated.  This means that a new header (and in some instances a trailer as 
well) is added by the lower layer.  It is correct to say that the higher layer “is 
encapsulated inside” or “is tunneled inside” the lower layer.  Likewise on the other 
end, data arrives from a lower layer and is passed up into a higher layer.  As this 
happens, the header that was previously added is removed.  The remaining data 
(including any remaining higher layer headers) is passed up to the next higher layer.  
This exact same principle is used when building a VPN.  In any VPN, however, the 
encapsulation is more complex than the standard OSI packaging.  VPN encapsulation 
necessarily involves encryption and hashing of the “carried” payload; i.e. the higher 
layers. 
1. Layer 5 (Application Layer) VPN 
The question remains, which is the best type of VPN to use for cyber-
exercises?  For the SSL VPN at layer 5, encapsulation and cryptography is applied as 
the traffic exits layer 5.  Since this is at a relatively high layer, it offers the advantage 
of makes it easier to add an SSL layer 5 VPN implementation to a network.  This is 
because it is not necessary to involve the operating system.  However, the drawback is 
that the current design of layer 5 SSL VPNs will only encapsulate http traffic.  Since 
cyber-exercise traffic involves much more than just http traffic, this limitation is 
impractical and makes an SSL VPN unsuitable for use with a cyber-exercise.    
Consequently, a layer 5 VPN is not recommended for cyber-exercises.  Layer 5 VPNs 
are currently used for creating secure tunnels between e-commerce clients and servers, 
e.g. customers and vendors of credit card and PayPal online payment transactions.  It 
allows each individual user to create a secure (typically one-way) VPN and send their 
secure traffic utilizing an http interface. 
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2. Layer 2 (Link Layer) VPN 
For a layer 2 transfer protocol (L2TP) or point to point transfer protocol 
(PPTP) VPN, the encapsulation and cryptography are applied as the traffic exits layer 
2, i.e. between layer 2 and layer 1.  Layer 1 is the actual transmission media.  Just as 
layer 5 was a little too high to be ideal for a cyber-exercise VPN, layer 2 turns out to 
be too low.   
In a typical layer 2 VPN, the higher layer information goes through the 
encapsulation process and reaches layer 2.  There it is then encapsulated and encrypted 
by cryptographic functions supported by the point to point protocol (PPP).  Though 
this completely encrypted frame (i.e., involving layers two and higher) can be 
successfully conveyed across the public switched telephone network (PSTN) (i.e., a 
circuit-switched network, where the transmission path is pre-established prior to data 
transmission), it cannot be routed through the packet-switched network of the Internet. 
In order to successfully route these encrypted PPP packets over the Internet, the 
packets would need to be further encapsulated inside of an IP header by means of a 
generic routing encapsulation (GRE) header.  The packet would then be placed in the 
appropriate layer 2 frame (e.g., Ethernet, ATM, Frame Relay, 802.11, etc.) for 
conveyance across the various layer 2 technologies that comprise the Internet.  
This is a tremendous amount of unnecessary processing and header overhead 
considering that cyber exercises are expected to be conducted between networks 
already directly connected to the Internet.  In simpler terms, layer 2 VPN solutions 
exist to support remote users whose access to the Internet is via the PSTN and where 
there is little choice in accepting the extra overhead of additional encapsulations.  
Layer 2 VPN solutions are not ideal for cyber-exercises. 
3. Layer 3 (Network Layer) VPN 
Finally, for the IPSec VPN, the encapsulation and cryptography is applied as 
the packet exits layer 3, i.e. between layer 3 and layer 2.  This turns out to be the ideal 
solution for cyber-exercise VPNs.  Unlike the layer 5 implementation described above, 
the only devices that need to be involved in VPN encapsulation and de-capsulation for 
a layer 3 IPSec VPN are the IPSec VPN endpoint devices.  Additionally, all 
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applications in the upper layers above layer 3 now gain an advantage from the 
implementation of the VPN at layer 3, since layer 3 is a lower layer.  The upper level 
protocol data unit (PDU) can be carried as a layer 3 VPN payload without any 
modifications made to the PDU before being VPN processed.  A layer 3 IPSec VPN 
implementation allows all upper layer applications and their PDUs to be processed 
through the VPN encapsulation and cryptography.  At the same time it allows the 
encapsulated packets to be freely sent over Internet routers, switches, and hubs. 
Layer three is the best all around choice in which to implement a cyber-
exercise VPN.  Properly constructed, the layer 3 IPSec VPN allows all cyber-exercise 
traffic, regardless of application, to receive confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity 
protection.  Confidentiality is achieved through the use of encryption. Integrity and 
authenticity are achieved through the proper combination of hash algorithms and the 
validation of shared secrets or PKI certificate essential credentials. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has taken a look at the role of cryptography, VPN endpoint 
authentication, and VPN interaction with the network layers.  Cryptography, when 
combined with robust protocols, attempts to provide any or all of the three information 
security attributes: confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity.  VPN endpoint 
authentication, using either a pre-shared secret or digital certificate, is essential to 
ensure VPN function.  Finally, a VPN must be properly integrated with the underlying 
network layers.  The next step to understanding how a VPN works is to recognize the 
interrelations of a VPN with network protocols.  An understanding of IPSec is 
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III. IPSEC VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK MANAGEMENT 
A functioning virtual private network (VPN) uses many varied network 
protocols, each of them working together to ultimately provide a secure channel for 
communications.  Internet protocol security (IPSec) is a standardized collection of 
security protocols.  If IPSec is improperly employed, all aspects of a VPN can be 
adversely affected.  Therefore, it is crucial that IPSec be examined and understood. 
A. IPSEC PROTOCOL BASICS 
In addition to the encryption algorithms and authentication hash algorithms 
mentioned in Chapter II, other main components of IPSec that need to be discussed 
include security protocols and security modes.  The design of IPSec is modular.  As 
the components listed above change and strengthen, the overarching IPSec structure 
does not have to change but can absorb the new technology.  In selecting a VPN 
implementation and beginning to explain and understand IPSec, it is easiest to start 
from the inside out, to begin with the most basic component and work outward. 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the basic components of security are 
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity.  In building a VPN the user must know 
which of these components are required for the intended implementation.  
Unnecessary attributes may result in putting an unnecessary load on the processor. 
B. SECURITY PROTOCOLS: AH AND ESP 
IPSec involves two security protocols, authentication header (AH) and 
encapsulating security payload (ESP).  The AH protocol is designed to provide 
integrity, authentication, and replay protection for the processed datagram.  Integrity is 
provided through the use of an encrypted hash of the protected datagram.  Network 
hash algorithms that are commonly implemented are Message Digest 5 (MD5) and 
several variants of the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA).  Authentication is provided via 
the use of the unique shared element, either the pre-shared secret or public key 
infrastructure (PKI) certificate.  This element, which is the basis for encrypting the 
traffic between the two users, is then used in conjunction with the hash function to 
provide both integrity and authentication.  Replay protection is provided via a 
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sequence number value available in the AH protocol header.  Diagrams of a normal 
internet protocol (IP) packet and an IP packet with AH is shown below in Figures 1 
and 2:   
 
IP Header Payload 
Figure 1.   Normal IP Packet 
 
IP Header AH Header Payload 
Figure 2.   IP Packet Using AH Protocol 
 
AH processing takes the original IP header and payload, plus the pre-shared 
secret, and hashes this information.  This information is carried in the AH header.  
This AH header is placed in between the IP Header and the rest of the packet, as seen 
in Figure 2.  Upon arriving at the other end of the VPN, the VPN peer, who possesses 
the pre-shared secret, takes the IP header, payload, and key, and hashes it.  The peer 
then compares this value to the hash value in the AH header.  If they match, data 
integrity is assured.  Realize that some of the fields in the original IP header are 
mutable, i.e. the values change in transit (e.g. the time-to-live field).  These mutable 
fields are excluded from the hash.  Therefore it is true that AH only provides partial 
protection of the IP header.  Unfortunately, the AH protocol is not designed to provide 
confidentiality, i.e. encryption. 
The IPSec encapsulating security payload (ESP) protocol is designed to 
provide integrity, authentication, replay protection, and through the use of encryption, 
ESP offers confidentiality.  ESP can use many of the modern encryption algorithms, 
including the data encryption standard (DES), 3DES, and the advanced encryption 
standard (AES).  The use of encryption provides a certain amount of protection against 
network sniffers.  Authentication and replay protection are provided in the same way 
the AH protocol provides these services.  With ESP, it is possible to use encryption by 
itself, but it is better if encryption, the integrity check, and authentication are all used 
together.  If only encryption is used, packets could be manufactured by an attacker to 
mount a cryptanalytic attack where the manufactured packets could be sent through 
the VPN and then analyzed and compared to the original packets to eventually 
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determine the cryptographic key.  However, if all three protections are used together, 
then this attack is defeated.  [MAI01] 
A VPN packet utilizing ESP will be provided confidentiality, message 
integrity, and authentication. A block diagram of an ESP packet is shown in Figure 3. 
 








Encrypted and  
Authenticated 
Not encrypted,  
Not authenticated 
Figure 3.   IP Packet Using ESP Protocol 
 
Compare this with the normal IP packet, Figure 1.  ESP processing uses 
encryption and takes the original IP header and the original payload and encrypts 
them.  This serves as the payload for the new packet.  A new IP header is placed out 
front.  An ESP header is placed between the newly generated payload and the newly 
generated IP Header.  An ESP trailer and ESP authentication information 
(unencrypted) is placed at the end of the packet.  It is important to note that when the 
packet arrives at the other end of the VPN, the peer checks the ESP authentication 
information first.  If the arriving packet does not pass the authentication test, the 
packet is discarded.  This prevents the wasting of processing power that might be used 
to decrypt the packet.  This dropping of packets that do not meet authentication 
requirements also helps lessen the impact of a denial of service attack.  Unfortunately, 
this encryption does not come for free.  ESP processing adds approximately 24 bytes 
per packet.  If traffic volume is critical, then this extra 24 bytes per packet must be 
taken into account. 
C. SECURITY MODES: TUNNEL AND TRANSPORT 
Now that AH and ESP have been explained, both protocols can work in one of 
two security modes, either tunnel mode or transport mode. 
In transport mode, the ESP (or AH) generated header is inserted immediately 
before the original IP header, that is, between the packet payload and the original IP 
header, as shown in the diagrams above.  The original IP header cannot be subjected in 
its entirety to a checksum integrity check since the original IP header contains mutable 
fields that will change enroute (e.g., the time-to-live field).  Therefore in transport 
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mode only partial authentication can be provided for the header.  The header 
information must not be encrypted since Internet routers must be able to read the 
header information in order to route the packet.   
In order to use transport mode, the device that generates the VPN must also be 
the host computer.  In other words, in transport mode the user of the VPN tunnel is 
also the provider of the VPN tunnel.  In a cyber-exercise, this is seldom the case.  In 
the typical cyber-exercise that is the focus of this thesis, there is a single device (a 
VPN security gateway) that is the VPN tunnel provider.  Then there is a network of 
hosts behind this provider that are all VPN users.  This VPN security gateway is the 
only entry and exit point into and out of the exercise network.   
Using the AH protocol in transport mode, only the Open Systems 
Interconnection (ISO) transport layer (layer 4) and higher are affected.  Transport 
mode leaves the layer 3 IP header information exposed, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
IP Header AH Header Payload 
partly authenticated authenticated 
Figure 4.   IP Packet Using AH Protocol in Transport Mode 
 
Compare this to the normal IP packet, figure one.  Similarly, using ESP in 
transport mode leaves the original IP header information exposed as shown in Figure 
5. 
 




Not encrypted Encrypted Not encrypted 
Figure 5.   IP Packet Using ESP in Transport Mode 
 
To summarize transport mode, as was explained above, the header is not 
encrypted.  The actual source and destination of the VPN datagram is exposed, 
unencrypted, in the header of a transport mode packet.  Even if an attacker can see the 
true source and destination of the packets, this is not an issue for a cyber-exercise.   
This means that traffic in transport mode is subject to traffic analysis.  Additionally, 
private IP address space, as defined in RFC-1918  [REK96]  is often used as the 
network address space for the participants of cyber-exercises.  Detailed information 
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concerning VPNs and private address space is further addressed in Chapter V.  Using 
transport mode makes it impossible to route private address space for a cyber-exercise, 
unless network address translation (NAT) is used. 
In tunnel mode, the original IP header is left in place.  The original payload and 
original IP header are then encapsulated, and an entirely new IP header is added in 
front of this packet.  This is true whether tunnel mode is using the ESP or the AH 
protocol.  This, in effect, makes the original IP header part of a new datagram.  This 
has an added advantage in that the source and destination addresses in this new IP 
header only reflect the IP addresses of the VPN gateway secure tunnel endpoints.  The 
tunnel mode header no longer reflects the IP addresses of the original origin and 
ultimate original destination of the packet.  The original source and destination 
addresses are encrypted inside the tunnel mode packet as data.  Thus tunnel mode 
provides some protection from traffic analysis.  Additionally, tunnel mode is always 
used between two VPN gateways, i.e. tunnel mode is required when the VPN tunnel 
provider is not the VPN tunnel user.  This is exactly the case in a cyber-exercise, 
where a VPN device is placed out front of a network of computers. 
In tunnel mode, the entire packet is incorporated as data, and a new IP header 
is placed out in front, as shown in Figure 6.  Using tunnel mode effectively hides the 
original IP header information. 
 
New IP Header AH Header IP Header Payload 
partly authenticated Authenticated 
Figure 6.   IP Packet with AH in Tunnel Mode 
 
Unfortunately, using AH in tunnel mode still does not provide any 
confidentiality as there is no encryption being used.  However, using ESP in tunnel 
mode results in the original packet being encrypted and incorporated as data.  
Additionally, a new IP header, whose source and destination address reflects only the 
VPN gateway endpoints and not the original origin nor ultimate destination of the 
packet, is placed out in front.  Using ESP in tunnel mode provides confidentiality and 






ESP Header Original  
IP Header 
Payload ESP Trailer ESP Authentication 
Information 
Not encrypted Encrypted Not encrypted 
Figure 7.   IP Packet Using ESP in Tunnel Mode 
 
Protection in this last case is fairly robust.  The original IP header information 
is not only hidden but is encrypted.  The exposed IP header information will only 
expose the addresses of the two VPN secure gateways. 
D. AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS 
As the reader will recall from Chapter II, a VPN user setting up a VPN has a 
choice of authentication algorithms and encryption algorithms.  Those same principles 
and concerns already discussed must be paid close attention to.  Every time a user 
chooses to make a VPN more secure using a more robust encryption or hash 
algorithm, the user pays a performance penalty.  Choosing the correct strength of 
authentication and encryption algorithms for a cyber-exercise VPN is a choice that 
deserves some careful consideration.   
It is important to point out that cyber-exercises between universities do not 
require robust encryption. Though this statement may at first seem antithetical to the 
purpose of a VPN, remember that there is no expectation that sensitive (classified or 
otherwise) information is involved in any of the cyber-exercise traffic encompassed by 
this thesis.  The “privacy” afforded by the VPN in support of cyber exercises is there 
simply to sufficiently obscure any attack signatures so as not to cause alarm or result 
in the infiltration of nodes from the intervening Internet infrastructure. The integrity 
and authenticity afforded by the VPN ensures the exercise participants that no 
interloper has inserted him/herself into the exercise.  Further, as a safety feature, the 
VPN-encrypted traffic will pose no harm to non-participating Internet nodes in the off 
chance that malicious exercise related traffic gets misdirected. 
E. INTERNET KEY EXCHANGE SECURITY ASSOCIATION (IKE-SA) 
Once a user determines what needs to be protected and chooses the appropriate 
security protocols and modes, the actual VPN can be built.  The Internet Security 
Association Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) [MAU98] defines a framework for 
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authenticating and exchanging information with a peer, but does not specify the exact 
procedures utilized in each case.  The internet key exchange (IKE) provides a specific 
key management system.  IKE has two phases. 
During IKE phase I, the IKE security association (IKE SA) is built.  For phase 
I, the user is required to select an authentication method, which can be either a pre-
shared secret or a digital certificate.  This shared unique element serves to authenticate 
the end points and encrypt several parameters that will form the basis of operations 
conducted during the IKE phase II.   When phase I is complete, both VPN peers have 
been authenticated and possess a shared secret key. 
IKE phase I may be conducted in one of two modes, main mode and aggressive 
mode.  Both main and aggressive mode are designed to meet all requirements of IKE 
phase I.  Main mode accomplishes the goals of phase I with three two-way message 
exchanges for a total of six messages.  Aggressive mode uses three messages total. 
Using main mode, the first message exchange consists of both VPN peers 
agreeing on which algorithms and hashes to use.  During the second exchange, 
authentication material, either the pre-shared secret or a public key, is traded in the 
clear, and the Diffie-Helman (DH) key exchange protocol is used.  Through the use of 
DH, each peer generates the same shared secret key.  During this second exchange, a 
nonce is also sent to thwart a man in the middle attack.  The third and final exchange 
serves to complete the authentication of the peer. 
Using aggressive mode, the first message from the initiating peer includes all 
the material included in the first two messages of the main mode.  During the second 
message of aggressive mode, the responding peer sends back all information that is 
needed for a complete exchange, leaving the third message serving to confirm receipt 
of the second message. 
Using either main mode or aggressive mode completes the requirements of 
phase I.  A secure tunnel is now built between the peers.  This tunnel can be used to 
exchange information to facilitate IKE phase II. 
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F. INTERNET PROTOCOL SECURITY (IPSEC-SA) 
Once the endpoints of the tunnel are established and authenticated during IKE 
phase I, the second IKE phase begins.  IKE phase II is concerned with the building of 
the IPSec SA.  The purpose of the IPSec SA is to tell the VPN device how to protect 
the data packets that travel in the VPN tunnel. 
1. Quick Mode 
There is only one mode for IKE phase II, called the quick mode.  Phase II 
consists of two messages.  Working through the secure IKE SA tunnel established by 
IKE phase I, the two peers must agree on an IPSec SA.  During the first message, Peer 
A authenticates itself to Peer B and proposes an IPSec SA.  The IPSec SA consists of 
an encryption algorithm, a hash algorithm, security mode and security protocol, for 
example, 3DES, SHA-1, ESP, tunnel mode.  During the second message, Peer B 
replies to Peer A, authenticating itself and letting Peer A know if Peer B has a 
matching IPSec SA.  If a match does not exist, then the tunnel to transmit data cannot 
be built.  However, if a matching IPSec SA exists, then during message three Peer A 
responds that it has correctly received information from Peer B.  Data transmission can 
begin. 
2. Static and Dynamic Keying 
The IPSec SA includes a cryptographic key.  This key is not chosen by the 
VPN initiator, rather this key is automatically negotiated as part of the IKE phase II 
protocol.  A decision must be made about this negotiated IPSec SA key.  Depending 
on the security and performance requirements of the VPN users, the VPN designer can 
choose to have the IPSec SA key remain constant throughout the duration of the VPN.  
Alternately, the key can be chosen to be a dynamic key and it will be automatically 
renegotiated after a user-chosen period.  The renegotiation criteria are based on either 
time or kilobytes of data processed since the last IPSec SA key negotiation. 
3. Perfect Forward Secrecy 
A security concern exists with regard to the IPSec SA.  Recall that the IPSec 
SA is the security association that is encrypting the data being sent.  The key that is 
being used to encrypt the traffic can be automatically set to regenerate based on either 
time or number of kilobytes processed.  If an attacker were able to obtain a current key 
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being used to encrypt data, the attacker might possibly be able to derive the next key to 
be generated.  The attacker would then be able to decrypt all future packets.  This 
concern is countered by a cryptographic concept known as perfect forward secrecy 
(PFS).   
DH key exchange protocol allows two peers to generate a session key, i.e. a 
symmetric key to be used to establish the IKE SA.  The same DH techniques are used 
to achieve PFS by having the peers periodically generate new symmetric keys within 
the IPSec SA.  These new keys are not based on either previous symmetric keys or any 
long-term secrets that may be stored at either endpoint.  This provides PFS and makes 
it unlikely for an attacker, upon breaking one key and having access to a block of 
packets, to be able to break the next key and decrypt more data.  The attacker will have 
to work just as hard to break future keys as he/she did to obtain the first key. 
G. SPD, SPI, AND SAD 
These are three very similar terms that warrant explanation because they can 
easily be confused.  Unfortunately, they are all interrelated in a circular fashion and the 
explanation of one involves the mentioning of the other.  Therefore, these three items 
will simply be addressed in alphabetical order.  Finally, an example will be given that 
will show the reader the interrelation of all three. 
The security association database (SAD) is a list of IPSec SAs that is 
maintained by the peer.  It maintains all the necessary information about each SA.  
This information includes the security protocol, the security mode, the encryption 
method, and authentication method. 
The security policy database (SPD) conducts a type of packet filtering similar 
to that of a router access control list (ACL).  The SPD maintains entries of all types of 
traffic.  If an IPSec packet is detected, an entry in the SPD will tell the peer to go 
ahead and take the next step and look in the SAD to obtain the appropriate keys and 
protocols for use with that specific packet. 
The security parameter index (SPI) is a field in the header of a packet that 
identifies which IPSec SA the packet belongs to.  The peer device, upon receiving the 
 24
packet and looking at the SPI then knows which IPSec SA can successfully process 
that packet. 
What follows is an example that relates all three terms.  As a packet comes into 
the VPN peer device, the peer device looks at the header and determines that it is an 
IPSec packet due to a match found in the SPD.  The peer inspects the SPI value in the 
header.  The VPN peer then refers to the SAD, where it finds the correct SA keys and 
protocols to process the packet. 
H. USE OF DIGITAL CERTIFICATES FOR VPN ENDPOINT 
AUTHENTICATION 
In a cyber-exercise, there may potentially be more than two entities since 
several agencies may desire to participate.  As the number of participants, and thus 
VPN endpoints, grow, there are inherent disadvantages to using pre-shared secrets as 
the underlying authentication method.  Firstly, the cyber-exercise administrator must 
keep track of all keys for all participants.  Secondly and more importantly, when it is 
time to change the keys, every user must update all the keys for all participants 
simultaneously. 
Neither of these issues presents a truly insurmountable problem for cyber-
exercises.  However, the reason a cyber-exercise exists in the academic context is to 
educate the exercise participants.  As the participants take the concept of the VPNs 
learned in the cyber-exercise and apply it to real world situations, the second issue of 
having all users update their pre-shared secret at the same time becomes a problem.  
For example, having learned the process for setting up a VPN as part of a cyber-
exercise, exercise participants may one day be faced with a real world VPN.  They 
would have the decision of whether to use the pre-shared key method for 
authentication.  If there was a VPN being utilized between several banks, and one of 
the bank’s pre-shared secret was compromised in the middle of the day, then it would 
be very difficult to have all the other banks update the compromised key information 
with the new key and keep the system up and running.  A more scalable way to handle 
VPN endpoint authentication is to use x.509v3 digital certificates, commonly called 
“certificates”.  [ADA99] 
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Certificates can provide VPNs with easy scalability so long as the 
infrastructure that supports certificate management (i.e. PKI) is fully operational and 
utilized by all parties of the VPN.  A centralized certificate authority (CA) issues 
certificates to each VPN endpoint in a hierarchical fashion.  Through the use of digital 
signatures and this hierarchical structure, each VPN endpoint is able to verify the 
certificates of other VPN endpoints.  If the certificate of one VPN endpoint was 
compromised, then that endpoint would apply for and be issued a new certificate by 
the CA.   Once this new certificate is installed at the compromised end point, all other 
VPN endpoints can simply verify the new certificate using their own copy of the CA’s 
public key, rather than having to manually update a new shared key on the VPN 
gateway. 
There are multiple steps involved in configuring a VPN endpoint to use a 
certificate [MAS99, MAS04].  The VPN endpoint must: 
(1) Identify a CA 
(2) Generate Keys 
(3) Enroll the Device 
(4) Submit credentials to the CA for Certificate Generation 
(5) Install the certificate 
(6) Be configured to issue its certificate 
(7) Be configured to accept certificates from other devices 
(8) Be capable of verifying received certificates 
1. Identify a CA 
This is the CA that will provide a certificate.  CAs can be contacted either in 
band or out of band.  In the case of an in band request, the simple certificate 
enrollment protocol (SCEP) has been developed to facilitate in band requests.  If the 
request is out of band, then voice, or CDs, floppies, or FAXes can be used to deliver 
the certificate information to the CA.  Several commercial companies support CAs.  It 
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is also possible to build a CA on site.  NPS has built just such a CA, based on the 
Netscape Certificate Management System (NCMS).   
2. Generate Keys 
The VPN endpoint must generate a public and private key pair.  RSA key 
pairs, consisting of a public key and a private key, can be generated in increments of 
between 512 and 2048 bytes.  The private key is maintained (stored securely) by the 
endpoint, while the public key is used by the CA in the enrollment process. 
3. Enroll the Device 
The VPN endpoint makes a certified request to the CA for its certificates.  The 
public key cryptography standard #10 (PKCS#10) certificate request is the 
standardized method used to do this.  Information required by the PKCS#10 includes 
the common name of the endpoint, the organization name, locality, and state.  This 
PKCS#10 request and the public key of the VPN endpoint are sent to the CA.  As 
mentioned above, this certificate request can either be sent over the internet or via 
other out of band means. 
4. Submit Credentials to the CA for Certificate Generation 
The CA then generates a certificate for the VPN endpoint. The certificate is 
created when the CA uses its private key to encrypt (“sign”) the hash of the user’s 
identifying credentials together with his/her public key. The resulting certificate can be 
used for one of three common purposes: proof of identity, authentication, or 
encryption. Depending on the method of IKE-SA authentication, the purpose of the 
VPN gateway certificate will be authentication and/or identity. The CA has its own 
certificate.  If the CA is at the top of the hierarchical tree then that CA has a root, or 
“self-signed”, certificate.  If the CA is a non-root CA then it will have a “subordinate” 
certificate; i.e., a certificate that is signed by a higher level CA (possibly the root CA).  
Once the appropriate certificates have been generated and copied to the CA’s database, 
the CA sends the requested certificate(s) along with its own and any parent certificates 
to the requesting VPN endpoint. 
5. Install the Certificate 
Once the certificates are received by the VPN endpoint, they are validated and 
installed on the device.  The exact process for this varies from device to device. 
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6. Be Configured to Issue Its Certificate 
The endpoint device must be properly configured to issue its certificate in 
order to interact with peer devices that also use certificates for authentication.  The 
exact configuration steps vary from device to device. 
7. Be Configured to Accept Certificates from Other Devices 
The endpoint device must be properly configured to accept digital certificates 
as the means for authentication from peer devices.  This configuration action will be 
elaborated upon in Chapter V. 
8. Be Capable of Verifying Received Certificates 
Finally, the peer device must be able to verify that the certificate received from 
a peer is current and valid.  A certificate revocation list (CRL) is maintained by CAs 
for this purpose. The endpoint device must be properly configured to check the 
certificate received from a peer and verify that the certificate received is not on the 
CRL. There are alternative methods of achieving certificate revocation validation (e.g., 
OCSP, SCVP, delta-CRLs, Merkle-Trees, etc.), but these mechanisms are even less 
widely supported than the simple full CRL method mentioned here.  [HOU02, 
MYE99] 
I. SPLIT-TUNNELING 
In mentioning the security association database above, the idea of split 
tunneling must be addressed.  Whether to permit split tunneling is a choice a VPN user 
needs to make.  Traffic originating from a network can either go into the VPN tunnel, 
can be sent outside the VPN tunnel (unprocessed by IPSec), or can be dropped.  Split 
tunneling occurs when the user makes the choice to allow some traffic to leave the 
network without entering the tunnel.  There are two scenarios: 
If a VPN designer desires that traffic to a targeted network or networks be 
processed by IPSec and sent via the VPN, yet other traffic sent in the clear, i.e. outside 
the VPN, then the user implements split tunneling.  The entries in the security 
association database are compared to the destination address of an incoming packet.  If 
it is destined for a targeted VPN network, then the SAD references the SPD, and the 
appropriate IPSec SA is applied.  If the traffic is not destined for a targeted VPN 
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network, then the traffic is sent in the clear.  This is a common scenario before a 
cyber-exercise.  The traffic being sent to other agencies needs to go through the VPN.  
Yet at the same time participants are making final preparations and hardening their 
networks for the cyber-exercise.  They need to be able to send traffic in the clear to 
various websites not involving the VPN. 
If a user desires that traffic to a target network be tunneled, yet all other traffic 
be dropped, the user is in effect calling for the VPN to drop any packets whose 
destination address in not already recorded in the security policy database, i.e. packets 
that are not destined for another participating VPN endpoint.  This is the case during 
the cyber-exercise.  Since cyber attacks are being launched and potentially employing 
hacker tools, the administrators of the cyber-exercise desire that all exercise traffic be 
sent only through VPN tunnels to other competitors.  Under no circumstance should 
there be an opportunity for a cyber-exercise attack packet to be sent in the clear to an 
address on the Internet that is not involved in the exercise. 
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This Chapter has provided a review of IPSec, security modes, and security 
protocols.  The interaction of the security policy database (SPD), security association 
database (SAD), and the security parameter index (SPI) were examined, as well as the 
interrelation of digital certificates and the employment of split tunneling.  Now that 
these components of a VPN have been explained, they can now be mapped to the 
needs of building a VPN for a cyber-exercise.  Chapter IV describes the characteristics 
of each VPN component, and tells how suitable that component is for building a VPN 
to support a cyber-exercise. 
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IV. CYBER-EXERCISE NEEDS 
Building on what has been illustrated in Chapter III about all the potential 
choices in virtual private network (VPN) technology, the desired characteristics of a 
VPN for use in a cyber-exercise will now be reviewed. 
A. ARCHITECTURE: LAYER 2, LAYER 3, OR LAYER 5 
Since a cyber-exercise will be conducted between the networks of two or more 
universities or agencies, the VPN must span all participating networks.  Chapter II 
discussed the interaction of VPN technology over three different layers of the Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model.  In examining the needs of a cyber-exercise, the 
most likely configuration for the exercise is two networks which are linked together.  
The cyber-exercise VPN gateway is placed in front of the cyber-exercise participant’s 
network.  Current technology to link networks utilizes an IPSec-based layer 3 VPN.  
The linking of these two networks is commonly called a LAN-to-LAN VPN.  The 
building of this “LAN-to-LAN” VPN will be looked at in Chapter V.  Linking cyber-
exercises will require a LAN-to-LAN VPN. 
B. IKE SA: PRE-SHARED KEY OR DIGITAL CERTIFICATE 
Cyber-exercise participants could choose to use pre-shared keys or digital 
certificates for VPN endpoint authentication.  Pre-shared keys are simpler to both 
understand and implement.   Digital certificates are more complex to understand and 
implement, yet provide a greater measure of scalability.  Since there will be a finite 
number of participants in a cyber-exercise, the ease and security of pre-shared keys 
makes them preferred to digital certificates.  Additionally, since the skill level of the 
cyber-exercise participants is unknown, digital certificates may add an unnecessary 
level of complexity that is not needed.  If a cyber-exercise participant is unable to get 
digital certificates working on their VPN, this would exclude them from the exercise. 
C. IPSEC SA: STATIC KEY OR DYNAMIC RE-KEYING 
A static internet protocol security (IPSec) security association (SA) key that 
processes all data and remains the same throughout the life of the VPN is simpler.  
However, if the cyber-exercise traffic was captured and the key decoded by a third 
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party, all exchanges between the VPN parties could be read.  If the cyber-exercise 
were still in progress, the third party could continue to follow the conduct of the 
exercise. 
A dynamic IPSec SA key that changes throughout the cyber-exercise is more 
complex to implement, but it would prevent the third party monitoring problem 
mentioned above.  If the key is dynamically changed, even if all cyber-exercise traffic 
was captured and recorded, the third party could only read a subset of the traffic before 
needing to stop and decode the new IPSec SA key for the next segment of cyber-
exercise traffic.  Of course if the key was changed so often that there was not enough 
packet data to conduct and effective cryptographic analysis, then perhaps none of the 
cyber-exercise traffic could be read. 
It is important to note that the primary concern of cyber-exercise participants is 
the simple obscuration of the traffic between the two schools.  An extremely high 
degree of confidentiality, i.e. strong encryption, is not required.  There is no 
confidential or otherwise classified traffic that needs to be protected.  Therefore a 
static pre-shared secret will provide adequate security for a cyber-exercise.  Dynamic 
re-keying would only be used if the cyber-exercise administrator felt the need to 
implement this dynamic re-keying mechanism for the educational benefit of the 
participants.   
D. SECURITY PROTOCOL: AH OR ESP 
Cyber-exercise participants must choose between the encapsulating security 
payload (ESP) and authentication header (AH) security protocol.  After examining 
their characteristics in Chapter III, the reader will realize that cyber-exercise 
participants require the ability to obscure traffic between the VPN endpoints using 
encryption.  AH does not allow the use of encryption.  ESP is the only security 
protocol that provides this needed confidentiality.  Despite the increased processor 
load and the extra 24 bytes per packet, the confidentiality needs of a cyber-exercise 




E. SECURITY MODE: TUNNEL OR TRANSPORT 
Cyber-exercise participants must choose between tunnel or transport mode.  
During a cyber-exercise, the network for the participant will lie behind the VPN 
gateway device.  As discussed in Chapter III, using transport mode means that the 
tunnel endpoint is the tunnel provider.  This is an unlikely the case for cyber-exercises. 
Therefore tunnel mode should be used for a cyber-exercise. One rare exception to this 
is the case where a participant school with very few resources to allocate to the cyber 
exercise may wish to participate using only a single computer. The school will likely 
run multiple target servers and scanning/assessment software from this one machine. 
Only in this unlikely instance would transport mode would be appropriate.  
F. ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE: DES, 3DES, AES 
Within both the internet key exchange (IKE) SA and the IPSec SA, an 
encryption algorithm must be chosen.  Common choices include the digital encryption 
standard (DES), 3DES, and the advanced encryption standard (AES128, AES192, 
AES256).  General technical information about the algorithms has already been 
discussed in Chapter II, but here performance information will be considered.   
Research into the comparative performance of modern encryption algorithms 
was unable to locate one resource that compared all algorithms under the same 
conditions.  The relative performance of the algorithms changed with respect to the 
size of the traffic the algorithm was processing [DHA02, CIS777].  A recurring phrase 
was concerning the precise performance of an algorithm was “it depends”.  Exact 
performance varies depending on the operating system, the type of processor, and, as 
mentioned, the size of the packets that are being transmitted.  Therefore, the rankings 
in the table below are not able to be quantified with meaningful numbers, i.e. saying 
that a certain algorithm is always X-percent faster than another algorithm.  
Nevertheless a highest through lowest throughput ranking was able to be assembled 
after consulting several sources.  The findings are detailed in Table 1.  
Through reviewing test results from Dr Wei Dai and Cisco documentation, 
AES128 (i.e. Rijndael-128) provided the highest throughput [DAI01, CIS05].  
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AES192 provided the second highest throughput, followed by AES256 [DAI01].  
Tests conducted by Dr. Bart Preneel during the New European Schemes for 
Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption (NESSIE) Project, and supported by Dr Dai’s 
research, showed that DES provided lower throughput than all AES algorithms tested 
[DAI01, PRE01].  Finally, Cisco test results [CIS05] as well as testing at the Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, found that 3DES provided the least throughput [AMP01, 
DUN96].  The algorithms are listed from highest throughput to the lowest throughput 










Table 1. Encryption Algorithm Performance Comparison 
 
G. ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM STRENGTH 
It may be tempting to conclude that encryption algorithm strength is directly 
related to key length, but this is not necessarily the case when comparing distinct 
algorithms.  Algorithm strength depends not only on key length but on how resistant 
the algorithm itself is to cryptanalytic attack.  Research conducted by Dr Lenstra 
(results listed in Table 2) provided a ranking of the relative security of common 
algorithms [BEY02, LEN99].  A remark in a Cisco configuration guide supports this, 










Table 2. Encryption Algorithm Strength Comparison 
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Additional research confirmed that DES offered adequate security until 1997 
[LEN99, DES01].  In 1999, DES encryption was defeated as part of a computer 
challenge competition in just 22 hours.  [ENC02]   Taking a look at 3DES, as of 1998 
3DES did not have a security problem [DEN98] but 3DES did have an efficiency 
problem [REA01].  The search for a faster, yet still secure algorithm, is what prompted 
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) series of conferences. [REA01]. 
 
H. HASH ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE: SHA-1 VS. MD5 
To use both the IKE SA and the IPSec SA, a hashing algorithm must be 
chosen.  Chapter II provided an overview of the functionality of Message Digest 5 
(MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1).  When considering the optimum 
hashing function to use for a cyber-exercise, performance must be considered.  When 
SHA-1 and MD5 throughput were compared, MD5 provided higher throughput than 







Table 3. Hash Algorithm Performance Comparison 
 
I. HASH ALGORITHM STRENGTH: SHA-1 VS. MD5 
When considering a hashing function to use for cyber-exercises, the strength of 
the hashing function must also be considered.  As detailed in Chapter II, SHA-1 
produces a 160-bit hash while MD5 produces 128-bit hash.  The MD5 hash function, 
in certain cases, has been shown able to be defeated [ENC01].  Defeating a hash 
algorithm involves being able to generate a pair of messages that produce the same 
hash. The SHA-1, when used within the Hashed Message Authentication Code 
(HMAC) has not been defeated [GLE98].  The MD5 and SHA-1 hash algorithms are 









Table 4. Encryption Algorithm Strength Comparison 
 
J. VPN GATEWAY DETAILS: CONCENTRATOR, ROUTER, OR 
COMPUTER 
The first option for a VPN gateway is to build the gateway on a dedicated 
general-purpose computer using software.  The advantage to this is that any 
organization that wishes to participate in a cyber-exercise, regardless of their budget, 
can configure an extra lab computer to act as their cyber-exercise VPN gateway.  
There are several freeware/open-source VPN software packages, such as FreeS/WAN, 
that allow a knowledgeable individual to turn a general-purpose computer into a VPN 
gateway.  The disadvantage is that often the encryption options are limited to those 
built into the software by the software package programmer.  Software based VPNs 
can be difficult to scale, especially if the user chooses to implement some of the 
advanced VPN features such as dynamic key sharing. 
The second option for a VPN gateway is a router that is VPN-capable.  It is 
similar to the software solution.  Hopefully an organization that wants to participate in 
a cyber-exercise has a router that is either VPN-capable, or can purchase the necessary 
IOS upgrade to make it that way.  This solution is more expensive than the software 
solution but also provides the VPN cyber-exercise administrator with more options in 
selecting security modes, encryption algorithms, etc.  Additionally, router-based VPNs 
are likely to be more thoroughly tested for security, and are generally much easier to 
configure than the open source software counterparts. 
Finally, the last option examined for use as a VPN gateway is the dedicated 
VPN Concentrator.  Similar to the router, the VPN Concentrator that was examined as 
part of this thesis could actually perform the functions of many different network 
components: a DHCP server, a firewall, and an intrusion detection system.  Schools 
wishing to teach and practice “defense-in-depth” via their involvement in cyber-
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exercises may appreciate having a single device that can be used to employ multiple 
facets of network defense: firewalling, intrusion detection, and encrypted tunneling.   
As shown in Chapter I, VPN users have a choice of VPN gateway devices.  
VPN concentrators, VPN-capable routers, and general purpose computers running 
VPN software can all be used to create a VPN.  VPN concentrators are specialized 
devices and may not be available to all participants.  End user computers running VPN 
software are accessible to all participants.  However, the most popular open source 
VPN software, FreeS/WAN, has just had development discontinued as of March 1, 
2004.  [FSW01, SCH04]  There was a final elease of FreeS/WAN 2.06 on April 22, 
2004, but the development group no longer exists.   
Routers, however, are accessible to all cyber-exercise participants.  Making a 
router VPN-capable only involves a change in its internetwork operating system 
(IOS).  As will be shown in Chapter V, Cisco routers incorporate an easy to 
understand graphical user interface (GUI) based configuration interface, called the 
security device manager (SDM).  This GUI also allows the user to graphically picture 
all components of the VPN, i.e. the IKE SAs and the IPSec SAs.  This aids in user 
understanding of the VPN.  Since most cyber-exercise participants will have access to 
a VPN-capable router, coupled with the fact that the cyber-exercise participants are 
most easily able to visualize the building of the VPN on the router GUI, the VPN-
capable router has advantages that surpass the other competing devices. 
K. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has related the theoretical concepts of the VPN, discussed in 
Chapter I and Chapter II, to the building of a VPN for a cyber-exercise.  VPN 
architecture, endpoint authentication, keying, and security protocols and modes have 
been related from the theoretical to the practical.  Encryption and hash algorithms have 
been examined for performance and security.  In light of the needs of cyber-exercise 
participants, gateway devices received a close look.  The building of an actual VPN 
will take this theorectical knowledge and employ it within commercial devices.  
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V. THREE VPN ALTERNATIVES 
Now that a close look has been taken at the theory behind virtual private 
network (VPN) technology, three techniques will be shown to build VPNs between 
two devices.  The two devices are a Cisco 3005 VPN concentrator, and a Cisco 
2651XM router.  These devices were chosen because they are representative of typical 
devices that many cyber-exercise participants may already possess, or can easily 
obtain.  The devices used in this thesis were donated by Cisco to the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  The three techniques will entail: 1) a graphical user interface 
(GUI) based configuration of the concentrator, 2) GUI-based configuration of the 
router by way of the security device manager (SDM) interface, and 3) a command line 
interface (CLI) configuration of the router. In the end, the two devices will be 
interchangeable as VPN endpoints, e.g. a VPN could exist between the Cisco 
concentrator and Cisco router with SDM, or between the Cisco router with SDM and 
Cisco router using CLI, or any combination. 
In Chapter IV, a cyber-exercise VPN was proposed that consisted of LAN-to-
LAN connection using the encapsulating security payload protocol in the tunnel mode 
with a pre-shared static key.  In the following example below, a VPN will be built on a 
Cisco router using the command line interface, on a Cisco router using the SDM, and 











   Encryption: 3DES 
   Hash: MD5 
   Authentication: Pre-Share 
IPSec Transform Set 
   Mode: ESP, Tunnel 
   Encryption: 3DES 
   Authentication: MD5_HMAC 
Table 5. VPN Parameters for the Example VPN 
 
In Chapter VI, there will be a further discussion of precisely which encryption 
and hash algorithms should be chosen for the optimum VPN for a cyber-exercise. 
A. ROUTER TO ROUTER USING CLI 
One option for a LAN-to-LAN VPN is to use VPN-capable routers for both 
VPN gateways.  The Cisco Corporation provided two 2651XM Routers for evaluation 
to the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Information Systems Security Studies 
and Research (CISR). These two routers were used for construction of the router-to-
router VPN discussed in this section. 
1. VPN Capability of Intended Routers 
The first step in setting up a router-based VPN is to determine if the routers are 
VPN-capable.  VPN functionality is enabled in two phases within Cisco routers.  First, 
the router’s Internetwork Operating System (IOS) needs to be of capable of handling 
VPN commands.  Second, the router may have a Cisco VPN Hardware Accelerator 
card installed.  This card is a hardware component that can be user-installed within the 
router to enhance its performance.  [CIS03] 
The quickest and easiest way to determine if a router IOS is VPN-capable is to 
create the initial configuration, described below, and get to the router’s configuration 
(config t) mode, and type “crypto ?” to see if the router recognizes the crypto series of 
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VPN commands which would be indicated by a reply listing related crypto options; 
e.g., ipsec, isakmp, map, etc.  If the router understands the “crypto” command, then 
the router has VPN functionality incorporated into its IOS.  An alternate way would be 
to try to reference the Cisco IOS the router is running and see if that IOS supports 
VPN functionality.  There does not appear to be a free resource that does this.  In order 
to get this information, a Cisco Connection Online (CCO) account is needed.  CCO 
accounts are an item that Cisco sells.  Thus, if a router purchase or router evaluation 
request is planned for a university and VPN functionality is desired for cyber-
exercises, Cisco representatives will be able to discuss which IOS needs to be ordered 
with a router in order to assure VPN functionality. 
If the router IOS is VPN-capable, the router may have a VPN accelerator 
hardware card installed.  Cisco calls such hardware devices advanced interface 
modules (AIMs).  [CIS01] The VPN accelerator AIM takes the encryption processing 
load off the router’s primary CPU.  According to Cisco documentation, an AIM 
equipped router results in up to a 10x performance increase over a non-AIM equipped 
device.  The AIM that is compatible with the NPS BNP 2651XM router is either the 
AIM-VPN/Base Performance (BP), or the AIM-VPN/Enhanced Performance (EP) 
module.  Realize that for cyber-exercises, the AIM is not normally needed, and was 
not used for this thesis.   
To determine if a router has an AIM installed, from the router privilege mode, 
use the “show version” command.  An abbreviated list of what is returned shown in 
Table 6.   Notice the AIM, if installed, will be displayed as “1 Virtual Private Network 









Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software 
IOS (tm) C2600 Software (C2600-JK9O3S-M), Version 12.2(15)ZJ3, EARLY DEPLOYMENT 
RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2) 
 
System image file is "flash:c2600-jk9o3s-mz.122-15.ZJ3.bin" 
 
Cisco 2651XM (MPC860P) processor (revision 0x200) with 125952K/5120K bytes of  
memory. 
Bridging software. 
4 Ethernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s) 
2 FastEthernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s) 
4 Serial(sync/async) network interface(s) 
1 Virtual Private Network (VPN) Module(s) 
32K bytes of non-volatile configuration memory. 
32768K bytes of processor board System flash (Read/Write) 
 
Configuration register is 0x2102 
Table 6. Verifying Router Installation of the AIM 
 
2. Network Planning/Analysis for the Cyber-Exercise 
The scenario for the cyber-exercise VPN for this thesis involves two networks.  
The first network is the NPS Bastion Network, behind the NPS firewall.  The second 
network is made to simulate another university or agency participating in the cyber-
exercise, which for the purposes of this thesis is called the University of C (U of C).  
This network is not behind a firewall, however if it was, techniques similar to those 
that NPS uses to pass VPN traffic through the NPS firewall would be used to allow 
VPN functionality with U of C. 
If a cyber-exercise was being planned from scratch, much thought would have 
to go into the address spaces that lie behind the VPN gateways, i.e. on the “private” 
(vice “public”) side of the VPN.  It is easiest to use an IETF allocated private address 
space.  Table 7 lists private address space, as defined in RFC 1918.  [REK96] 
Private: 10.0.0.0 - 10.255.255.255 (/8 prefix) 
Private: 172.16.0.0 - 172.31.255.255 (/12 prefix) 
Private: 192.168.0.0 - 192.168.255.255 (/16 prefix) 
Table 7. Private IP Address Space 
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In the case of the planned cyber-exercise between NPS and U of C, the 
network structure was predetermined.  The network information for both parties is 
shown in Table 8 and Table 9.  A diagram of the router to router LAN-to-LAN 
network is shown in Figure 8. 
NPS BNP_VPN Gateway IP: 131.120.8.199/22 
NPS BNP_VPN Network Default Gateway: 131.120.8.1 
NPS BNP Cyber-exercise Network ID: 10.1.0.0/24 
Table 8. NPS Bastion Network Project (BNP_VPN) IP Information 
 
U of C VPN Gateway IP: 63.205.26.67/27 
U of C Network Default Gateway: 63.205.26.65 
U of C Cyber-exercise Network ID: 192.168.0.0/24 
Table 9. University of C (UofC_VPN) IP Information 
 
 
                                  (10.1.x.0/24 network)                                                              (NPS network) 
 
             10.1.1.5/24                                   10.1.1.1/24                          131.120.8.199/22         
                  (NIC)                                    PRIVATE f0/0                          PUBLIC f0/1 
             “BNP” CPU                                               2651XM “BNP” Router 
 
                                                                                                                                   NPS Default Gateway 




COMCAST Default Gateway 
63.205.26.65 
 
   (COMCAST network)                                                      (192.168.0.x/24 network) 
 
                          65.205.26.67/27                     192.168.0.250/24                             192.168.0.251/24 
                            PUBLIC f0/1                          PRIVATE f0/0                                         (NIC) 
                                         2651XM “UofC” Router                                                     “U of C” CPU 
 
Figure 8.   Router to Router Network Diagram 
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3. Basic Configuration of the NPS BNP Router 
All router configurations usually begin with a router connected via a console 
cable.  Instructions for how to do this can be found in Cisco Documentation, i.e. Cisco 
2600 Series Routers Hardware Installation Guide. 
Ensure that the router is powered off.  Connect the provided console cable 
from the serial port (COM1) on a computer to the “console” port on the router.  Open 
a hyperterminal connection on the computer and ensure the settings listed in Table 10 
are entered.  Data that is entered by the user is shown in bold.  Information provided 
by the device is shown in normal font. 
Connect using:   COM1 
Bits per second: 9600 
Data Bits:       8 
Parity:          None 
Stop Bits:       2 
Flow Control:    None 
Table 10. Configure the Hyperterminal Connection 
 
This will open an active hyperterminal connection to the router.  Power on the 
router.  This will result in the IOS image of the router decompressing into the router’s 
RAM. The progress of the decompression process is depicted on the hyperterminal 
screen via a sequence of many pound (#) signs. 
Taking into account the NPS BNP information and the network diagram in 
Figure 8, the following commands in Table 10 are entered into the router. 
Would you like to enter the initial configuration dialog? [yes/no]: y 
Would you like to enter basic management setup? [yes/no]: n 
First, would you like to see the current interface summary? [yes]: n 
  Enter host name [Router]: NPS_BNP 
  Enter enable secret: MyPassword2 
  Enter enable password: MyPassword3 
  Enter virtual terminal password: MyPassword4 
  Configure SNMP Network Management? [yes]: n 
  Configure LAT? [yes]: n 
  Configure bridging? [no]: n 
  Configure IP? [yes]: y 
    Configure RIP routing? [yes]: y 
  Configure AppleTalk? [no]: n 
  Configure DECnet? [no]: n 
  Configure CLNS? [no]: n 
  Configure Async lines? [yes]: n 
Do you want to configure FastEthernet0/0  interface? [yes]: y 
  Use the 100 Base-TX (RJ-45) connector? [yes]: y 
  Operate in full-duplex mode? [no]: n 
  Configure IP on this interface? [yes]: y 
    IP address for this interface: 10.1.1.1 
    Subnet mask for this interface [255.255.255.0] : 255.255.255.0 
Do you want to configure Serial0/0  interface? [yes]: n 
Do you want to configure FastEthernet0/1  interface? [yes]: y 
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  Use the 100 Base-TX (RJ-45) connector? [yes]: y 
  Operate in full-duplex mode? [no]: n 
  Configure IP on this interface? [yes]: y 
    IP address for this interface: 131.120.8.199 
    Subnet mask for this interface [255.0.0.0] : 255.255.252.0 
Do you want to configure Serial0/1  interface? [yes]: n 
Do you want to configure Serial0/2  interface? [yes]: n 
Do you want to configure Serial0/3  interface? [yes]: n 
Do you want to configure Ethernet1/0  interface? [yes]: n 
Do you want to configure Ethernet1/1  interface? [yes]: n 
Do you want to configure Ethernet1/2  interface? [yes]: n 
Do you want to configure Ethernet1/3  interface? [yes]: n 
[0] Go to the IOS command prompt without saving this config. 
[1] Return back to the setup without saving this config. 
[2] Save this configuration to NVRAM and exit 
    Enter your selection [2]: 2 
Table 11. Configure the Bastion Network Project Router 
 
In order to ensure compatibility with a sniffing hub, it is a good idea to set the 








Table 12. Set Router Port Speed to 10MBps 
 
There are only a few steps remaining.  The VPN designer, before VPN 
functionality is added, must ensure connectivity from the router to the rest of the 
network.  The IP default-gateway command ensures that if a packet’s destination 
address is not in the router’s routing table, the packet is sent to the router’s default 
gateway where it will be properly routed.  Do this according to the settings in Table 








Table 13. Configure the Router Default Gateway 
 
Taking into account the U of C information, Table 9, and the network diagram, 
Figure 8, a similar set of commands is entered into the peer router.   
4. Entering VPN Functionality in the Routers 
At this point both routers are configured to route traffic, but not to tunnel 
(VPN) traffic. It is wise to test the connectivity of the two routers to ensure that they 
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can communicate before any VPN functionality is added.  Ping checks followed by a 
trivial file transfer protocol (TFTP) transfer of a small file is one recommended way to 
do this.  
5. Command Line Configuration of the VPN 
In order to implement this VPN via the CLI on the router, enter the commands 
as shown in Table 14. 
Step NPS BNP_VPN Router Commands Purpose 
1 BNP_VPN>en BNP_VPN>password 
BNP_VPN#config t 
Puts router into general 
configuration mode. 
2 BNP_VPN(config)#crypto isakmp policy 1 Begins the configuration of the 
IKE policy that will be used 
during the establishment of the 
IKE SA.  This policy number, 
in this example, number “1”, 
can be any number between 1-
10000.  
3 BNP_VPN(config-isakmp)#encryption 3DES Notice the router entered 
“config-isakmp” mode.  
Specifies 3DES as the 
encryption algorithm within 
IKE policy #1. 
4 BNP_VPN(config-isakmp)#authentication pre-share Specifies a pre-shared secret 
as the authentication method.  
A pre-shared secret is a 
symmetric key. 
5 BNP_VPN(config-isakmp)#group 2 Specifies Diffie-Helman 
Group Two for the exchange 
of keying material during the 
creation of the IKE tunnel. 
6 BNP_VPN(config-isakmp)#exit Done with IKE Policy 1. 
Exits out of config-isakmp 
mode. 
7 BNP_VPN(config)#crypto isakmp key 12345 address 63.205.26.67 Specifies that the mutually authenticating pre-shared 
secret is “12345”, and that the 
“peer” (i.e., other end gateway 
for this tunnel) router for the 
VPN is 63.205.26.67 
Note that this command does 
not enter the user into a new 
configuration mode, i.e. the 
router prompt does not change. 
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Step NPS BNP_VPN Router Commands Purpose 
8 BNP_VPN(config)#crypto ipsec transform-set BNPTRANSFORMSET esp-3DES 256 esp-md5-hmac Begins the configuration of the Transform Set.  In this case, 
the IPSec transform-set is 
named 
“BNPTRANSFORMSET”.  A 
transform set consists of a 
mode, and an encryption and 
authentication protocol pair.  
BNPTRANSFORMSET uses 
ESP mode, with 3DES 
encryption and MD5 hashing.  
9 BNP_VPN(cfg-crypto-trans)#crypto map BNPCRYPTOMAP 10  ipsec-isakmp Notice that the router entered “cfg-crypto-trans” mode.  
This command creates the 
crypto map, named 
“BNPCRYPTOMAP” in this 
example.  Only one crypto-
map can be applied to a router 
interface.  In order to 
differentiate between multiple 
VPNs emerging from the same 
router interface, the crypto 
map sequence number can be 
varied to create several 
“crypto map entries”.   
Here, BNPCRYPTOMAP 10 
is being built.  The “10” is a 
sequence number, a unique 
number between 0 and 65535, 
used to identify specific 
information for this crypto 
map and its peer.  Each crypto 
map entry would be used to 
establish IPSec security 
associations for a VPN tunnel.  
It would therefore be possible 
to build BNPCRYPTOMAP 9, 
BNPCRYPTOMAP 11, etc.  .   
10 % NOTE: This new crypto map will remain disabled until a peer and a valid access list have been configured. Comment produced by the router. 
11 BNP_VPN(config-crypto-map)#set peer 63.205.26.67 Notice the router entered 
“config-crypto-map” mode.  
This command sets the other 
end of the VPN tunnel for 
BNPCRYPTOMAP #10 to be 
63.205.26.67. 
Each crypto map entry must 
have a unique VPN peer. 
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Step NPS BNP_VPN Router Commands Purpose 
12 BNP_VPN(config-crypto-map)#set transform-set BNPTRANSFORMSET Specifies the transform set assigned to this crypto map.  
In this case, the 
BNPTRANSFORMSET has 
already been created and the 
crypto map entry assigned is 
BNPCRYPTOMAP 10.  Only 
one transform set is allowed 
per crypto map. 
13 BNP_VPN(config-crypto-map)#match address 110 The match address command 
within this crypto map entry 
points the router at extended 
Access List 110.  An Extended 
Access List, numbered 
between 100-199, allows 
filtering on source address, 
destination address, and 
application port number as 
appropriate.  The “match 
address” command tells the 
router to treat Access List 110 
differently, telling the router 
which traffic to tunnel.  Traffic 
not mentioned in this ACL 
will be not be tunneled unless 
that traffic is named in another 
crypto map entry. 
14 BNP_VPN(config-crypto-map)#set PFS group2 (optional) 
Allows the use of PFS, as 
discussed in Chapter III. 
15 BNP_VPN(config-crypto-map)#exit Exits from configuring the crypto map. 
16 BNP_VPN(config)#interface FastEthernet0/1 Prepares the router to 
configure the FastEthernet 
interface 0/1  
17 BNP_VPN(config-if)#crypto map BNPCRYPTOMAP Notice the router entered “config-if” mode.  Applies the 
crypto map to the interface.  
Now, all traffic that matches 
the rule 110 that passes 
through f0/1 will be processed 
by the VPN crypto engine. 
18 BNP_VPN(config-if)#exit Exits from configuring the interface. 
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Step NPS BNP_VPN Router Commands Purpose 
19 BNP_VPN(config)#crypto ipsec security-association lifetime seconds 28800 Defines the IPSec security lifetime as 28800 seconds 
(eight hours).  The lifetime can 
be between 120 and 86400 
seconds (24 hours). 
Note that this command does 
not enter the user into a new 
configuration mod, i.e. the 
router prompt does not change. 
20 BNP_VPN(config)#access-list 110 permit ip 10.1.1.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 Defines the Access List already mentioned and 
matched above.  Tells the 
router to tunnel all traffic 
going from the BNP_VPN 
private network (10.1.0.0) to 




Exits out of configuring the 
router. 
Table 14. NPS BNP_VPN Router Commands 
 
Similarly, the U of C router is configured.  Commands for the U of C router are 









UofC_VPN(config)#crypto isakmp key 12345 address 131.120.8.199 
UofC_VPN(config)#crypto ipsec security-association lifetime seconds 28800 
UofC_VPN(config)#crypto ipsec transform-set UOFCTRANSFORMSET esp-3DES 256 esp-md5-hmac 
UofC_VPN(cfg-crypto-trans)#crypto map UOFCCRYPTOMAP 10 ipsec-isakmp 
% NOTE: This new crypto map will remain disabled until a peer and a valid access list 
have been configured. 
UofC_VPN(config-crypto-map)#set peer 131.120.8.199 
UofC_VPN(config-crypto-map)#set transform-set UOFCTRANSFORMSET 
UofC_VPN(config-crypto-map)#match address 110 
UofC_VPN(config-crypto-map)#set PFS group2 
UofC_VPN(config-crypto-map)#exit 
UofC_VPN(config)#int f0/1 
UofC_VPN(config-if)#crypto map UOFCCRYPTOMAP 
UofC_VPN(config-if)#exit 









6. Verification of the VPN Built using CLI 
Since both parties of the cyber-exercise will be sending ”attack” and possibly 
experimental traffic via the VPN over the infrastructure of the Internet, it is worth 
verifying that the VPN has been built correctly and is indeed sending encrypted 
packets.  To do this, place a hub with a packet sniffer attached to it between the VPN 
gateway and the internet connection.  The program “Ethereal”, available for free from 
www.ethereal.org, is an excellent program to sniff traffic for this purpose.  Since the 
behavior of a hub is to broadcast all packets received out each port of the hub, the 
sniffing computer will receive all traffic entering or exiting the VPN gateway and will 
be able to determine if this traffic is ESP (i.e., VPN-encrypted) traffic. 
Shown in Figure 9 is the Ethereal capture of a packet sniffed from between two 
host computers.  The two host computers were not using a VPN, thus the packet was 
sent in the clear.  The packet transferred was a text file that was sent using TFTP. The 
text file contained the characters “hello040225”. There are two items to note.  First, 
inspection of the packet highlighted on line “40” of the trace, in the column labeled 
“Protocol”, the reader can see that the packet is a TFTP packet.  Second, in the lowest 
area of the screen, in the characters to the right, one can see the contents of the packet 
in the clear, i.e. the words “hello040225”.  Without a VPN there is no protection for 




Figure 9.   Ethereal Packet Capture in the Clear 
 
 Shown in Figure 10 is the Ethereal capture of a packet sniffed from between 
two host computers.  This time, the two host computers were using a VPN employed 
in ESP mode, thus the packet was sent encrypted.  The packet transferred was the 
same text file as sent previously, again using TFTP. Recall that the text file contained 
the characters “hello040225”. Making the same observations as above, except this 
time inspecting the packet highlighted on line “46376”, one can see that in the column 
labeled “Protocol” the packet is classified as ESP vice TFTP.  An observer cannot tell 
what the actual payload is, only that it is being sent in a VPN using the ESP protocol.  
As further evidence of the “privacy” afforded by a VPN, in the lowest area of the 
screen, in the payload decoded characters to the right, one can see that the contents of 
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the transferred file (“hello040225”) are no longer legible as plaintext.  
 
Figure 10.   Ethereal Packet Capture with VPN 
 
B. ROUTER TO ROUTER USING SECURITY DEVICE MANAGER 
As previously mentioned, an alternative to the CLI configuration of VPN 
functionality on the routers is to utilize the security device manager (SDM) on routers 
that have it installed.  
1. Verifying and Enabling SDM 
The Cisco SDM is a graphical user interface (GUI) that enables the user to 
configure the router visually rather than through a series of commands.  The SDM may 
or may not be supported on a device.  The Cisco document “Release Notes for SDM 
Version 1.0” gives a list of which router and IOSs support SDM.  To determine if a 
router has SDM functionality, enter the “dir” command from the privileged exec mode 







Table 16. Determine Router SDM Functionality 
 
Routers configured with SDM will show the SDM files in Flash memory 
depicted in Table 17. 
Directory of flash:/ 
    1  -rw-    21959780        <no date>  c2600-jk9o3s-mz.122-15.ZJ3.bin 
    2  -rw-         940        <no date>  sdmconfig-26xx.cfg 
    3  -rw-       14617        <no date>  sdm.shtml 
    4  -rw-     2617856        <no date>  sdm.tar 
    5  -rw-        1446        <no date>  home.html 
    6  -rw-      214016        <no date>  home.tar 
 
Table 17. Router SDM Configuration 
 
In order to use the SDM functionality, it must first be enabled via the CLI.  
After the basic configuration of the router (see Chap. 5, Sec. B.2), input the following 
additional commands in Table 18 to enable the SDM web browser interface: 
BNP_VPN(config)#ip http secure-server 
BNP_VPN(config)#ip http authentication local 
BNP_VPN(config)#username BNP_VPN privilege 15 password 0 mypassword 
 
Table 18. Enabling SDM Browser Interface 
 
These further commands shown in Table 19 will allow access to the 
configurations screens of the SDM. 
BNP_VPN(config)#line vty 0 4 
BNP_VPN(config-line)#privilege level 15 
BNP_VPN(config-line)#login local 
BNP_VPN(config-line)#transport input telnet ssh 
 
Table 19. Commands to Enable Access to the Router SDM 
 
2. Logging in and Configuring SDM 
In order to log into the NPS BNP SDM, the host computer must be configured 
with an IP address that puts it on the same network as the router’s private interface.  In 
this example, a cyber-exercise network computer is used to configure the NPS BNP 
VPN router via the SDM.  The computer already has its IP address statically assigned 
to 10.1.1.5. 
 52
Log into the SDM via a web browser.  Since https (i.e., secure http) was 
enabled, in this example, the address used is: 
https://10.1.1.1 
This results in the main SDM window is shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.   Cisco Security Device Manager (SDM) 
 
Click on the “Security Device Manager” link.  This will start the identification 
and authentication process for logging into the SDM.  A pop-up window will appear, 
Figure 12, asking for a username/password.   
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Figure 12.   Cisco SDM Login 
 
This is the username and password that was entered in the command: 
username BNP_VPNprivilege 15 password 0 mypassword  
 
Once access to the SDM is gained, the following steps will build the VPN. 
First, build the IKE in the pop-up window shown in Figure 13. 
From the SDM, select “Advanced Mode”, “VPN”, and under directory tree 







D-H Group: group2 
Life Time: 24h 0min 0sec 
 
Figure 13.   SDM Add the IKE Policy 
 
Click “OK”.  
The resulting screen is shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14.   SDM IKE Policy Added 
 
Now enter the pre-shared keys.  From the SDM, select “Advanced Mode”, 
“VPN”, and under directory tree “VPN”, select “IKE”, select “Pre-shared Keys” and 
click the “Add”.  Note the SDM will eventually show the user what CLI text entries 
would need to be made if the router were being configured via the CLI.  This makes it 
particularly convenient if one router is being configured via SDM and the other peer 
router does not have SDM but must rely on configuration from the CLI.  Therefore in 
this example, the names are purposefully chosen to be descriptive so that later it will 
be easier to see how each entry in the SDM box relates to its corresponding CLI 
command.)  
For this example, in the window in Figure 15, enter: 
Key: SecretVPNKey#1 
Re-enter Key: SecretVPNKey#1 
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Host/Network 
Type: IP Address 
IP Address: 65.205.26.67 
Subnet Mask: 255.255.255.224 / 27 
 
 
Figure 15.   SDM Input the Pre-Shared Key 
 
Click “OK”.  
The resulting screen is shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16.   SDM Pre-Shared Key Complete 
 
Next, it is necessary to build the VPN connection.  This is best done by 
assembling each component first.  The components the SDM provides are IPSec 
Policies, Transform Sets, and IPSec Rules.  Then the user is able to select the 
components into the final VPN Connection, by expanding the “VPN” icon at the top of 
the menu tree. 
First, build the IPSec Rule using an Access Control List (ACL).  From the 
SDM, select “Advanced Mode”, “VPN”, and under directory tree “VPN”, select 
“IPSec”, select “IPSec Rules” (ACLs) and click the “Add”.  An Extended Rule is 






Figure 17.   SDM Add an ACL Rule 
 
Click “Add” 
This brings up an “Add an Extended Rule Entry” screen, Figure 18.  Enter: 
Select an action: Protect the Traffic 
Description: Extended Rule Description 
Source Host/Network 
Type: A Network 
IP Address: 10.1.0.0 
Wildcard Mask: 0.0.255.255 
Destination Host/Network 
Type: A Network 
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IP Address: 192.168.0.0 
Wildcard Mask: 0.0.0.255 
 
 
Figure 18.   SDM ACL Rule Entry 
 
Click “OK”.  This results in the information being loaded back into the 
previous screen, as shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19.   SDM Rule Added Complete 
 




Figure 20.   SDM IPSec Rule Complete 
 
Now build a Transform Set.   
From the SDM, select “Advanced Mode”, “VPN”, and under directory tree 
“VPN”, select “IPSec”, select “Transform Sets” and click the “Add”.  In the window 
that appears, Figure 21, click the “Show Advanced”.  Enter: 
Name: BNP_VPN_Transform_Set_1 
Data integrity and encryption (ESP): checked 
Integrity Algorithm: ESP_SHA_HMAC 




Since this VPN uses ESP, leave the “Data and address integrity without 
encryption (AH)” box unchecked.  (It is an either/or consideration.) 
Mode: Tunnel (Encrypt data and IP header) 
IP Compression (COMP-LZS): leave unchecked 
 
 
Figure 21.   SDM Add a Transform Set 
 
Click “Add”.  The result is shown in Figure 22. 
 63
 
Figure 22.   SDM Transform Set Added Complete 
 
Now it is time to add IPSec Policies (Crypto Maps).  Completing the other 
steps first will allow the selection of a Transform Set and an IPSec Rule (ACL) during 
this step.  From the SDM, select “Advanced Mode”, “VPN”, and under directory tree 
“VPN”, select “IPSec”, select “IPSec Policies (Crypto Maps)” and click the “Add”.  
The input screen is shown in Figure 23.  Enter the name. 
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Figure 23.   SDM Add IPSec Policy 
 
Click “Add” and this brings up an “Add Crypto Map” screen with four folders, 
“General”, “Peer Information”, “Transform Sets”, and “IPSec Rule”, as shown in 
Figure 24.   
The first folder is “General”.  The Name of IPSec Policy is already entered and 
grayed out. 
Description: BNP_VPN_IPSec_Policy Description 
Sequence Number: 1 
Security Association Lifetime: 
Kilobytes: 4608000 
HH:MM:SS: 24 0 0 
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Figure 24.   SDM Add Crypto Map: General Tab 
 
It is on this screen, Figure 25, that a user can enable PFS, as discussed in 
Chapter III. 
From here, click the next folder, “Peer Information”.  Input the IP address of 
the peer network (or hostname) and click “Add” to move it to the “Current List”. 
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Figure 25.   SDM Add Crypto Map: Peer Information 
 
From here, click the next folder, “Transform Sets”.  Since a Transform Set was 
already built, choose “BNP_VPN_Transform_Set_1” from the “Available Transform 
Sets” and click the “>>” button to move it to the “Selected Transform Sets” 
(Preference Order), Figure 26.   
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Figure 26.   SDM Add Crypto Map: Transform Set 
 
It is possible to hit the “Add” button and go through the same steps as was 
completed above in “Transform Sets” 
From here, click the next folder, “IPSec Rule”. Similar to “Transform Sets”, an 
appropriate IPSec Rule for this example was already built.  Click the box with the 
down arrow in it, resulting in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27.   SDM Add Crypto Map: IPSec Rule 
 
Click “Select an Existing Rule”.  As shown in Figure 28, pick “Rule_115”: 
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Figure 28.   SDM IPSec Rule: Select a Rule 
 
Click “OK”. 
Now all folders in the “Add Crypto Map” section have been properly filled in, 
as depicted in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29.   SDM Add Crypto Map: Rule Added 
 
Click “OK”.  This inputs the selections just made into the “Crypto Maps in this 
IPSec Policy” window, as shown in Figure 30. 
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Figure 30.   SDM IPSec Policy Added 
 




Figure 31.   SDM IPSec Policy (Crypto Map) Complete 
 
Finally, combine all these items, i.e. IPSec Policy, Transform Sets, and IPSec 
Rules (ACLs), into a VPN Connection.  From the SDM, select “Advanced Mode”, 
“VPN”, and click “Add” and select “New VPN Connection”.  The resulting screen is 
shown in Figure 32. 
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Figure 32.   SDM Add New VPN Connection 
 
Select Interface: FastEthernet0/1 
Choose IPSec Policy: BNP_VPN_IPSec_Policy 
This adds the policy to the lower dark gray window, as shown in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33.   SDM Add New Connection: Interface and Policy 
 
Click “OK” and this adds the new VPN Connection to the VPN Connections 
Window, as shown in Figure 34.   
 75
 
Figure 34.   SDM VPN in Place 
 
In the “VPN Connection” portion of the SDM window a red arrow down icon 
is displayed, Figure 34.  This arrow will not turn into the green arrow up icon until the 
peer VPN is properly configured, and some traffic is exchanged.  This process will be 
addressed later. 
This screen indicates that the VPN is ready for operation.  However if pings or 
other traffic were to be sent now, the VPN would not be operational because the 
commands have not yet been delivered to the router.  The SDM GUI must now send 
the commands to the router to update the router’s running configuration.  To do this, 
click on the “Deliver” button at the top of the screen.  Once done, a very convenient 




Figure 35.   SDM Deliver Configuration to Router 
 
It is possible to save these commands to a text file via the “Save to file” button 
on this screen.  This is a convenient way to learn what the proper configuration 
commands are.  Table 20 shows the result of the “Save to file” function.  These 
commands are the CLI commands that the user would have had to enter in order to do 
the same things that were accomplished via the SDM GUI. 
  
Configuration commands for the router: 10.1.1.1 
saved on 26-May-04 12:26:28 PM 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ip access-list extended Rule_115 
 remark Description for Rule_115 
 remark SDM_ACL Category=4 
 remark Extended Rule Entry Description 
 permit ip 10.1.1.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 
 exit 
crypto ipsec transform-set BNP_VPN_Transform_Set_1 esp-sha-hmac esp-3des 
 mode tunnel 
 exit 
crypto map BNP_VPN_IPSec_Policy 1 ipsec-isakmp 
 set transform-set BNP_VPN_Transform_Set_1 
 set peer 65.205.26.67 
 match address Rule_115 
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set security-association lifetime seconds 86400 
set security-association lifetime kilobytes 4608000 
exit 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
no crypto map 
crypto map BNP_VPN_IPSec_Policy 
exit 







crypto isakmp key ******** address 65.205.26.67 255.255.255.224 
 
Table 20. SDM Save to File CLI Commands 
 
Another worthwhile feature, if the user forgets to save the commands being 
delivered from the “Save to file” button just mentioned, is the “Generate Mirror” 
function.  The “Generate Mirror” button exists on the Advanced Mode>VPN screen 
and will produce the CLI commands needed to configure the peer router via the CLI, 
as shown in Figure 36.  This convenient feature drastically reduces the likelihood of 
making a mistake when configuring the peer router that will act as the VPN gateway at 
the far end of the tunnel. 
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Figure 36.   SDM Generate Mirror 
 
The peer router commands for the UofC_VPN router that were produced by 
using the “Generate Mirror” command on the BNP_VPN router are shown in Table 
21. 
The mirror configuration should only be used as a guide when configuring the peer. 
The following configuration MUST NOT be directly applied to the peer device. 
crypto isakmp policy 1 
 authentication pre-share 
 encr 3des 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
 exit 
crypto isakmp key !MyPassword! address 131.120.8.199 
crypto ipsec transform-set BNP_VPN_Transform_Set_1 esp-sha-hmac esp-3des 
 mode tunnel 
 exit 
ip access-list extended SDM_1 
 remark Description for Rule_115 
 remark SDM_ACL Category=4 
 remark Extended Rule Entry Description 
 permit ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 10.1.1.0 0.0.0.255 
 exit 
crypto map BNP_VPN_IPSec_Policy 1 ipsec-isakmp 
 description Apply the crypto map on the peer router's interface having IP address 
65.205.26.67 that connects to this router. 
 set transform-set BNP_VPN_Transform_Set_1 
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 set peer 131.120.8.199 
 match address SDM_1 
 set security-association lifetime seconds 86400 
 set security-association lifetime kilobytes 4608000 
 exit 
Table 21. SDM Generate Mirror CLI Commands 
 
3. Verification of the VPN Using SDM 
Once the commands are delivered, the VPN is ready to have the tunnel built.  
A ping from the local network to the remote network will activate/build the tunnel.  
Even after the tunnel is constructed, the Advanced Mode>VPN screen will still show 
the tunnel as “Red Arrow Down”.  To rectify this, click on the “Refresh” button 
located near the top of the screen.  The resulting green arrow is shown in Figure 37.  
For verification and a satisfying sanity check, the packets exchanged across the tunnel 
should be verified as IPSec encapsulated via a packet analyzer. 
 
Figure 37.   SDM VPN Connection Verified Up 
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There are several other functions pictured on the screenshot above that are 
worthy of note.  The “Ping Peer” button sends pings in the clear.  It allows the user to 
test the functionality of the router configuration without involving the VPN 
configuration.  This is useful if the VPN does not work.  Begin troubleshooting by 
checking that, in this case, the BNP_VPN router can ping the UofC_VPN router. 
The other button that is worth mentioning is the “Clear Connection” button.  If 
a tunnel is built, this button will reset the tunnel to a down status, awaiting the first 
traffic that will kick off IKE Phase One and cause the tunnel creation process. 
The SDM also supports a VPN monitor mode, shown in Figure 38.  The 
monitor mode allows the viewing of the traffic that is traversing the IPSec tunnel.   It 
shows information about the status of the tunnel, as well as the number of packets sent 
and received, including encapsulated, nonencapsulated, and error packets. 
 
Figure 38.   SDM VPN Monitor Mode IPSec Tunnels 
 
 81
With a change in the drop down menu, it is possible to monitor the IKE SA as 
well, as shown in Figure 39. 
 
Figure 39.   SDM VPN Monitor Mode IKE SAs 
 
C. VPN CONCENTRATOR TO ROUTER 
The second option is to utilize a VPN Concentrator as one of the end points.  It 
would be possible to use a VPN Concentrator at both ends of the VPN, but NPS only 
has access to one Cisco VPN 3005 Concentrator.  This section is a demonstration of 
how to build a VPN suitable for a cyber-exercise using a Cisco VPN Concentrator as 
one endpoint, and using the router as the other VPN endpoint.  The same network is 
being used between NPS and U of C as was used in the discussion above. The network 
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Figure 40.   VPN Concentrator to Router Network Diagram 
 
The first step is the basic setup of the VPN Concentrator.  Establish a 
hyperterminal connection to the concentrator exactly as was done for the router.  The 
commands are shown in Table 10.  When the concentrator is turned on, configuration 
can begin.  The commands are depicted in Table 22. 
Starting power-up diagnostics... 
 
... 
Copyright (c) Integrated Systems, Inc., 1992. 
Cisco Systems, Inc./VPN 3000 Concentrator Version 4.0.1.Rel May 06 2003 13:13:03 
Features:  
Initializing VPN 3000 Concentrator ... 
Waiting for CAPI initialization to complete... 
Initialization Complete...Waiting for Network... 
 





                Welcome to 
               Cisco Systems 
       VPN 3000 Concentrator Series 
          Command Line Interface 
Copyright (C) 1998-2003 Cisco Systems, Inc. 
 
 -- : Set the time on your device. The correct time is very important, 
 -- : so that logging and accounting entries are accurate. 
 -- : Enter the system time in the following format: 
 -- :       HH:MM:SS.  Example  21:30:00  for 9:30 PM 
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> Time 
Quick -> [ 13:51:10 ] 13:54:00 
 
 -- : Enter the date in the following format. 
 -- : MM/DD/YYYY  Example 06/12/1999  for June 12th 1999. 
> Date 
Quick -> [ 06/01/2004 ] 08/01/2004 
 
 -- : Set the time zone on your device. The correct time zone is very 
 -- : important so that logging and accounting entries are accurate. 
 -- : Enter the time zone using the hour offset from GMT: 
 -- : -12 : Kwajalein  -11 : Samoa    -10 : Hawaii          -9 : Alaska 
 -- :  -8 : PST         -7 : MST        6 : CST             -5 : EST 
 -- :  -4 : Atlantic    -3 : Brasilia  -2 : Mid-Atlantic    -1 : Azores 
 -- :   0 : GMT         +1 : Paris     +2 : Cairo           +3 : Kuwait 
 -- :  +4 : Abu Dhabi   +5 : Karachi   +6 : Almaty          +7 : Bangkok 
 -- :  +8 : Singapore   +9 : Tokyo    +10 : Sydney         +11 : Solomon Is. 
 -- : +12 : Marshall Is. 
> Time Zone 
Quick -> [ -8 ] -8 
 
1) Enable Daylight Savings Time Support 
2) Disable Daylight Savings Time Support 
Quick -> [ 1 ] 1 
 
This table shows current IP addresses. 
  Intf         Status       IP Address/Subnet Mask          MAC Address 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Ether1-Pri | Not Configured |        0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0    |               
Ether2-Pub | Not Configured |        0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0    |               
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DNS Server(s): DNS Server Not Configured 
DNS Domain Name:  
Default Gateway: Default Gateway Not Configured 
 
** An address is required for the private interface. ** 
> Enter IP Address 
Quick Ethernet 1 -> [ 0.0.0.0 ] 10.1.1.1 
 
> Enter Subnet Mask 
Quick Ethernet 1 -> [ 255.0.0.0 ] 255.255.255.0 
 
1) Ethernet Speed 10 Mbps 
2) Ethernet Speed 100 Mbps 
3) Ethernet Speed 10/100 Mbps Auto Detect 
Quick Ethernet 1 -> [ 3 ] 2 
 
1) Enter Duplex - Half/Full/Auto 
2) Enter Duplex - Full Duplex 
3) Enter Duplex - Half Duplex 
Quick Ethernet 1 -> [ 1 ] 3 
 
> MTU (68 - 1500) 
Quick Ethernet 1 -> [ 1500 ] 1500 
 
1) Modify Ethernet 1 IP Address (Private) 
2) Modify Ethernet 2 IP Address (Public) 
3) Save changes to Config file 
4) Continue 
5) Exit 
Quick -> 2 
 
This table shows current IP addresses. 
  Intf         Status       IP Address/Subnet Mask          MAC Address 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Ether1-Pri |      UP  |   10.1.1.1/255.255.255.0 | 00.03.A0.89.95.F3 
Ether2-Pub | Not Configured |        0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0    |               
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DNS Server(s): DNS Server Not Configured 
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DNS Domain Name:  
Default Gateway: Default Gateway Not Configured 
 
> Enter IP Address 
Quick Ethernet 2 -> [ 0.0.0.0 ] 131.120.8.199 
 
> Enter Subnet Mask 
Quick Ethernet 2 -> [ 255.255.0.0 ] 255.255.252.0 
 
1) Ethernet Speed 10 Mbps 
2) Ethernet Speed 100 Mbps 
3) Ethernet Speed 10/100 Mbps Auto Detect 
Quick Ethernet 2 -> [ 3 ] 2 
 
1) Enter Duplex - Half/Full/Auto 
2) Enter Duplex - Full Duplex 
3) Enter Duplex - Half Duplex 
Quick Ethernet 2 -> [ 1 ] 3 
 
> MTU (68 - 1500) 
Quick Ethernet 2 -> [ 1500 ] 1500 
 
1) Modify Ethernet 1 IP Address (Private) 
2) Modify Ethernet 2 IP Address (Public) 
3) Save changes to Config file 
4) Continue 
5) Exit 
Quick -> 3 
 
1) Modify Ethernet 1 IP Address (Private) 
2) Modify Ethernet 2 IP Address (Public) 
3) Save changes to Config file 
4) Continue 
5) Exit 




Table 22. Concentrator Initial Hyperterminal Configuration 
 
Table 22 showed the initial configuration.  The rest of the configuration will be 
accomplished using the graphical user interface provided for the 3005.  Ensure that the 
computer that was used for the serial cable hyperterminal connection to the 3005 is 
assigned an IP address that is compatible with the network created on the “private” 
side of the 3005.   
Utilize an ethernet cable between the PC network interface card (NIC) and the 
private port on the rear of the 3005.  Open a network connection and login to the 
network address of the 3005 Concentrator. 
Upon first login, the Quick Configuration window will appear, Figure 41.   
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Figure 41.   Concentrator Manager Welcome 
 
If the user chooses not to go through the Quick Configuration, it will never 
appear again unless a system reset is performed which will require going through the 
hyperterminal setup again.  Although it is possible to skip the Quick Configuration and 
then go into the individual configuration screens, it is recommended that the user take 
the guided tour through the Quick Configuration. 
Choosing Quick Configuration brings up the Interfaces Screen, Figure 42. 
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Figure 42.   Concentrator Initial Configuration: Interfaces 
 
Notice right away that at the top of the screen, the 3005 shows the user’s 
location within the menu structure.  Shown in Figure 42, it is “Configuration | Quick | 
IP Interfaces”.  Later, this hierarchical nomenclature that appears at the top of the 
screen will be echoed by a menu tree that will appear on the left side. 
The status of the public port shows “DOWN” because the Ethernet cable was 
not connected to the Public port on the rear of the 3005.  Note: It is possible to 
configure the 3005 without the public Ethernet cable connected. 




Figure 43.   Concentrator Initial Configuration: Interface 1 (Private) 
 
Notice that many of the options have already been configured.  However, this 
screen gives the user a chance to make any changes. 
Clicking “Apply” advances the Quick Configuration tour to the Configuring 
Ethernet Interface 2 (Public) screen, Figure 44. 
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Figure 44.   Concentrator Initial Configuration: Interface 2 (Public) 
 
Similar to the router configuration, if the user intends to connect an 
inexpensive hub between the VPN 3005 Concentrator and the Internet, it is 
recommended that the port speed not be set to “Auto”.  Select either 100Mbps or 
10Mbps.  Inexpensive hubs are often not able to automatically negotiate port speed 
and this will cause loss of connectivity. Likewise, be sure to select half-duplex as 
inexpensive hubs cannot handle full-duplex traffic. 




Figure 45.   Concentrator Initial Configuration: System Info 
 
This screen, Figure 45, allows the user to set several items that have not been 
able to be set before, namely the DNS Server, Domain, and Default Gateway.  The 
System Name, Time, and Daylight Savings preference appear again if the user wants 
to make changes. 




Figure 46.   Concentrator Initial Configuration: Protocols 
 




Figure 47.   Concentrator Initial Configuration: Address Assignment 
 
In this example, all computers on the private network already have their own 
IP addresses, so “Client Specified” is selected.  However, if the 3005 system was 
needed to play the role of a DHCP Server, this screen would allow the user to enable 
that functionality. 




Figure 48.   Concentrator Initial Configuration: Authentication 
 
In this example, a dedicated authentication server is not being used, so the 
internal authentication provided by the 3005 will ultimately provide this functionality. 




Figure 49.   Concentrator Initial Configuration: Authentication Database 
 
From the amount of documentation that is devoted to it, Cisco seems 
committed to using the 3005 for remote dial-up users.  This is where the administrator 
would enter the users and passwords.  For this thesis, however, no users are required. 




Figure 50.   Concentrator Initial Configuration: IPSec Group 
 
Groups are not required for a cyber-exercise LAN-to-LAN VPN.  Clicking 
“Continue” brings the Configuration | Quick | Admin Password screen, Figure 51. 
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Figure 51.   Concentrator Initial Configuration: Password Configuration 
 
This final screen in the Quick Configuration tour allows the user to change the 
default login and password.  Clicking “Continue” brings the last screen in the Quick 
Configuration tour, the Configuration | Quick | Done screen, Figure 52. 
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Figure 52.   Concentrator Initial Configuration: Complete 
 
There are many noteworthy items in Figure 52.   
A directory structure on the left has appeared which includes Configuration, 
Administration, and Monitoring.  Notice that these three are echoed by the Hotlinks 
near the middle of this window.  Also, the “Save Needed” icon appears at the top left.  
Anytime a configuration change has been made, the icon, which normally is a grayed 
out “save”, changes to an active “Save Needed”.  Clicking on it (recommended) saves 
the settings the user has input during the Quick Configuration tour. 
Next is the process of setting up the cyber-exercise LAN-to-LAN VPN.  
Navigating via the left side menu tree, select Configuration | Interfaces.  The resulting 
screen is shown in Figure 53. 
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Figure 53.   Concentrator Interfaces 
 
The user can observe that the selections made during the Quick Configuration 
are displayed.  If any settings needed to be adjusted, click on the hotlink.  To continue 
setting up the cyber-exercise VPN, in Figure 53, click Ethernet 1 (Private).  The 
resulting screen is shown in Figure 54. 
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Figure 54.   Concentrator Interface 1 (Private) General 
 
Unlike the Quick Configuration, there are four TABs in Figure 54.  The 
General TAB is the default view.  Routing Internet Protocol (RIP) needs to be 
configured, so click on the RIP tab: 
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Figure 55.   Concentrator Interface 1: Enabling RIP 
 
Ensure that the selections shown in Figure 55 are selected.  Click “Apply”, 





Figure 56.   Concentrator Interface 2 (Public): General 
 
Notice in Figure 56 there are a few items that are different from the Private 
screen.   
Ensure the “Public Interface” box is checked.  Before leaving this screen, 
select the “RIP” tab and configure its RIP exactly as the RIP tab was configured for 
Ethernet 1 (Private).  Click “Apply”.  Now select the Configuration | System | IP 
Routing | Default Gateways from the left side menu tree, Figure 57. 
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Figure 57.   Concentrator Default Gateway 
 
Figure 57 presents one of the most nonintuitive selections.  The Default 
Gateway and metric are self-explanatory, but the “Tunnel Default Gateway” is 
misleading.  The entry for “Tunnel Default Gateway” needs to be the network that is 
behind the private port of the 3005.  In other words, this is the network where the 
traffic to be encrypted comes from, which in this example is 10.1.1.5.  Click “Apply”. 
Navigating via the left side menu tree, select Configuration | Policy 
Management | Traffic Management | Network Lists and click “New”.  The resulting 
screen is shown, Figure 58. 
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Figure 58.   Concentrator Network List 
 
Two network lists need to be added, one Local and one Remote.  First add the 
Local network list.  Similar to the Tunnel Default Gateway previously, enter the 
network where the encrypted traffic will originate from, in this case 10.1.1.0.  Notice 
Cisco uses the wildcard notation, which is the one’s compliment of the subnet notation 
(i.e., in wildcard notation, 0=match, and 1=ignore).  The wildcard mask for /24 is 
0.0.0.255.  Click “Add” and the screen will return to the Network Lists screen, Figure 
60.  Click “New” and “Add” in the remote Network List.  The resulting screen is 
hown, Figure 59. 
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Figure 59.   Concentrator Network List: Add 
 
A final click on “Add” and the network will be added to the list, resulting in a 
the main Network Lists screen, where both Remote, Local, and Cisco generated 
default list exist, as shown in Figure 60. 
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Figure 60.   Concentrator Network List Added 
 
Navigating via the left side menu tree, select Configuration | System | 
Tunneling Protocols | IPSec | LAN-to-LAN and click “Add”.  The resulting screen is 




Figure 61.   Concentrator IPSec LAN-to-LAN Add 
 
Ensure that the appropriate entries are made.  Entries are shown for the 
example network being built.  Near the bottom of Figure 61, the two Network Lists 
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that were built in the previous step can be selected.  Clicking “Add” results in the 
information screen being presented, as depicted in Figure 62. 
 
Figure 62.   Concentrator IPSec LAN-to-LAN Configuration 
 
Clicking “OK” results in the LAN-to-LAN connection that was just created 
being shown, Figure 63. 
 107
 
Figure 63.   Concentrator IPSec LAN-to-LAN Added 
 
Navigating via the left side menu tree, select Configuration | System | 
Tunneling Protocols | IPSec | IKE Proposals.  The result is shown in Figure 64. 
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Figure 64.   Concentrator IKE Proposals: Active/Inactive 
 
Notice none of the Cisco preloaded selections offer the IKE Proposal that is 
needed, i.e. 3DES, SHA_1_HMAC_160, Group-2.  Click “Add” to build an IKE 
proposal.  The resulting screen is shown in Figure 65. 
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Figure 65.   Concentrator IKE Proposals Add 
 
Build the IKE proposal that is required, giving it a descriptive title.  Click 
“Add”.  This will go back to the Configuration | System | Tunneling Protocols | IPSec | 
IKE Proposals screen, Figure 66.  The newly created IKE proposal is not active. 
 110
 
Figure 66.   Concentrator IKE Proposal: Selected 
 
To activate the newly created IKE proposal, highlight it and click “<<Activate” 
to move it to the Active Proposals.  Move it to the top of the Active Proposals column 
by highlighting it again in the left pane and clicking “Move Up”.  The result is shown 
in Figure 67. 
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Figure 67.   Concentrator IKE Proposal: Prioritized 
 
Now, verify the IPSec Security Association.   
An IPSec SA has already been automatically built from the information that 
has been entered.  It is a good idea to verify that this automatically built SA meets the 
planned network’s needs.  Navigating via the left side menu tree, select Configuration | 
Policy Management | Traffic Management | Security Associations.  Highlight the SA 





Figure 68.   Concentrator Security Association Modify 
 
Click “Add”.  Observe that the SA has been added, Figure 69. 
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Figure 69.   Concentrator Security Associations 
 
D. DIGITAL CERTIFICATES 
Digital certificates are an alternate way to provide authentication during 
IKE phase I.  For the BNP, the NS Certificate Management System (NCMS) is 
used.  Within the BNP, the NCMS information is listed in Table 23. 
Type of CA server: NCMS 
IP address of the CA server: 10.1.13.2 
Host Name: MAAT.SILVERDRAGONS.BNP 
URL (same as IP?) https://maat.silverdragons.bnp:1027 
CA administrator contact information: ca@silverdragons.bnp 
Table 23. NMCS Data Summary 
 
1. Router to Router Use of Certificates Using CLI 
To implement digital certificates in the router using the CLI, the commands 
listed Table 24 are used.  Instead of using a pre-shared secret, a certificate is used in its 
place.  The numbers on the left in Table 24 are the step numbers that correspond to the 
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step numbers in Table 14.  In other words, where Table 14 has step one, additional 
steps are required, numbered in Table 24. 
 
Step NPS BNP_VPN Router Commands Purpose 
1a BNP_VPN(config)#crypto ca certificate query This is an optional step.  This command tells the router not to store certificates and 
CRLs on the router, but to retrieve them 
from the CA.  This will prevent the router’s 
non-volatile random access memory ( 
NVRAM) from filling up with certificates 
and CRLs. 
1b BNP_VPN(config)#clock timezone pst -8 clock set hh:mm:ss dd month yyyy Since certificates are time sensitive, it is essential that the router date, timezone, and 
time be set accurately.  Cisco routers use 
military time, and month by name (e.g. 
January). 
1c BNP_VPN(config)#ip domain-name silverdragons.bnp Tells the Cisco IOS how to complete unqualified host names. 
4a BNP_VPN(config)#crypto key generate rsa How many bits in the modulus [512]: 512 Generates a general purpose key consisting of one pair of RSA keys. 
After the prompt, the desired modulus is 
entered.  The default is 512 bits.  According 
to Cisco documentation, it will take a 2500 
Series router 20 seconds to generate RSA 
keys using 512 bit modulus.  A larger 
modulus will result in longer key generation 
times. 
The NCMS is capable of generating 
certificates for keys up to 2048 bits long. 
4a BNP_VPN(config)#Crypto ca identity LocalNameYouChoose Declares what CA the router will use.  This is only used locally.  It does not have to 
match the CA identity used by the VPN 
peer. 
Notice this enters the crypto CA identity 
mode. 
4b BNP_VPN(ca-identity)#enrollment url https://maat.silverdragons.bnp:1027 Specifies the URL of the CA and tells the router where to go to enroll the VPN 
endpoint. 
4c BNP_VPN(config)# Crypto ca crl request LocalNameYouChoose Tells the router the location where the CRL will be downloaded.  Use the same name for 
the CA as was used in step 1c above.   
4d BNP_VPN(ca-identity)#crl optional An optional command. 
Allows router to accept other peers’ 
certificates if the CRL is not accessible. 
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Step NPS BNP_VPN Router Commands Purpose 




% Do you accept this certificate? 
[yes/no]: Y 
This command allows the router to 
authenticate the CA to ensure the CA is 
valid.  Use the same name for the CA as 
was used in step 1c above.  The router was 
already told where the CA is located 
(above).  Since the CA certificate is self-
signed, the CA’s public key should be 
obtained out of band and manually 
compared to the fingerprint generated. 
4f BNP_VPN(config)#crypto ca enroll LocalNameYouChoose 
 
This command requests certificates from the 
CA for all the router’s RSA key pairs that 
were generated in line 4a. 
In Cisco, the two events of enrolling and 
obtaining certificates are both set in motion 
with the “crypto ca enroll” command. 
A password prompt will occur.  This 
password will be used by the CA 
administrator to authenticate this router in 
the future. 
Table 24. Router CLI Commands for Certificates 
 
2. Using the Certificate 
These commands have requested, generated, and installed the certificate(s).  
Now, instead of using pre-shared secret, the router can use certificates. 
In the BNP router table, Table 14, two steps in the sequence of commands to 
configure IKE change.  In step four, instead of “pre-share”, use rsa-sig, i.e. the line 
BNP_VPN(config-isakmp)#authentication pre-share 
   becomes 
BNP_VPN(config-isakmp)#authentication rsa-sig 
 
In step seven, the following line is not needed: 
 BNP_VPN(config)#crypto isakmp key 12345 address 63.205.26.67 
 Revoke that step using the “no” command, i.e.  
 BNP_VPN(config)#no crypto isakmp key 12345 address 63.205.26.67 
At this point, the VPN endpoint routers will use the certificates for 
authentication instead of the pre-shared secret. 
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3. Router to Router Use of Certificates using SDM 
Unfortunately, the Cisco SDM does not provide CA support. 
4. VPN 3005 Concentrator Use of Digital Certificates  
Very similar steps are followed to utilize certificates with the 3005 
Concentrator so no further details are provided here.  During its initial setup, the router 
already had the clock and time zone set and the IP domain name has been given.  This 
was shown earlier in this Chapter.   
5. Identify a Certificate Authority (CA) 
Certificate usage with the 3005 begins with the Certificate Management page.  
From the left side menu tree, select Administration | Certificate Management: 
 
 
Figure 70.   Concentrator Certificate Management 
 
Options to install certificates and enroll the 3005 with a CA are shown, Figure 
70.  The 3005 supports both manual and automatic certificate installation.  The manual 
method will be discussed first.  This discussion will continue and will include the use 
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of the certificate in the example VPN.  Once the reader has a good idea of this process 
and how it works, the automatic registration and installation of certificates, via SCEP, 
will be covered. 
6. Generate Keys and Enrollment 
The first step the 3005 needs to have completed is the installation of the CA 
certificate.  To do this manually, click on the “Click here to install CA certificate” in 
Figure 70.  This brings up the Administration | Certificate Management | Install | CA 
Certificate screen, shown in Figure 71. 
 
 
Figure 71.   Concentrator CA Certificate: Install 
 
This screen allows 3 methods of installing the CA certificate.  
The first way to install a CA certificate would be automatically.  Click “SCEP 
(Simple Certificate Enrollment Process)”.  This brings up the Administration | 
Certificate Management | Install | CA Certificate | SCEP, Figure 72. 
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Figure 72.   Concentrator CA Certificate SCEP 
 
Enter the URL and CA Descriptor and hit “Retrieve”.  Via SCEP, this will 
retrieve and install the CA certificate.  It is important that this step be accomplished in 
order to access the rest of the SCEP process.   
Currently in this thesis, the automated process of integrating a VPN with a CA 
server is not implemented.  The follow-on SCEP screens can not be illustrated.  
However, manual CA certificate generation via the BNP Netscape Certificate 
Management System (NCMS) was accomplished, and the manual process will be 
shown.  The reader will realize that the automatic SCEP screens are very similar to the 
manual screens shown in Figures 73 through Figure 85. 
A CA certificate was generated manually via NCMS.  This CA certificate was 
then passed out of band, via a floppy disc, to be used by the 3005.  This CA certificate 
allows certificate functionality with the Cisco 3005 VPN Concentrator.   
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To take a look at the manual process, the user would first need to go out of 
band and obtain the CA certificate, either as a *.cer file, or in the form of text.  A CA 
certificate ca.cer file was generated by the BNP NCMS. 
For the manual process, go to the Administration | Certificate Management | 
Install | CA Certificate screen, Figure 71.  There are two options.   
If Cut and Past Test is selected, this brings up the Administration | Certificate 
Management | Install | CA Certificate | Cut & Paste Text screen, Figure 73. 
 
 
Figure 73.   Concentrator CA Certificate Text: Cut and Paste 
 
The user would enter the certificate information here, preferably by cut and 
paste to avoid typographical errors, and click “Install”. 
The other option is to access the out of band CA certificate via the ca.cer file 
that is generated by the NCMS.  Access the Administration | Certificate Management | 




Figure 74.   Concentrator CA Certificate: Load from File 
 
Click Browse and find the filename on the floppy drive of the host computer 




Figure 75.   Concentrator CA Certificate: Upload 
 
In Figure 75, select the certificate and click “Open”.  This loads the file path of 
the ca.cer into the 3005.  Then click “Install”.  This installs the CA Certificate and 
automatically brings up the Administration | Certificate Management screen, Figure 




Figure 76.   Concentrator Certificate Management 
 
Clicking on the hotlink “view” allows the user to view the certificate as shown 




Figure 77.   Concentrator Certificate Management View 
 
Now, generate the identity certificate PKCS10 request.  Cisco has chosen to 
combine the execution of the next two steps of the six-step certificate process, 
Generation of Keys and the Enrollment Process.  Access the Administration | 




Figure 78.   Concentrator Certificate Management Enroll 
 
Click “Identity Certificate” to access the Administration | Certificate 
Management | Enroll | identity certificate screen, Figure 79.  Note the options available 
in Figure 79.  Figure 79 shows the user that to automatically generate an identity 
certificate with SCEP, the CA certificate must have also been installed with SCEP.  In 
this example, the CA certificate was not installed with SCEP.  Recall the CA 
certificate was installed manually.  Hence, in Figure 79, only the following manual 




Figure 79.   Concentrator Certificate Management Identity Certificate 
 
If a CA certificate had been installed via SCEP, Cisco manuals show there are 
two additional hotlink options that appear: 
     Enroll via SCEP at MSCAsvr02 
     Enroll via SCEP at MSCAsvr05 
In order to see these options, the user would have to install the CA certificate 
via SCEP, i.e. follow the “Click here to install a new CA using SCEP before 
enrolling” hotlink in Figure 79 and end up on the Administration | Certificate 
Management | Install | CA Certificate | SCEP screen, Figure 72, where the URL is 
entered. 
However, to continue with the manual process, click the hotlink “Enroll via 
PKCS10 Request (Manual)” in Figure 79 and access the Administration | Certificate 




Figure 80.   Concentrator Certificate Management Enroll via PKCS#10 
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Figure 81.   Concentrator Certificate Management PKCS#10 
 
Figure 81 is the PKCS #10 request form and combines the Key Generation step 
and the Enrollment step into one.  Enter all required information, including the Key 
Size.  When “Enroll” is pressed, the 3005 will generate public-private RSA keys and, 





Figure 82.   Concentrator Certificate Management  Enrollment Request Generated 
 
Using the browser “Save As” function within the inner pop-up window, the 
user can save the certificate to the host computer and ultimately to a floppy drive.  The 
certificate can be sent out of band to the CA so an identity certificate can be generated. 
At this point, the user can go back to the Administration | Certificate 




Figure 83.   Concentrator Certificate Management  View 
 
Unfortunately, the NPS NCMS was unable to generate an identity certificate 
using the pkcs0001.txt output file from the 3005.  Troubleshooting with the NCMS 
system administrator showed that a plug-in was needed by the NCMS in order to 
manually generate the identity certificate.   
However, once an identity certificate has been generated and the 3005 has been 
enrolled, its identity certificate would reside in the 3005.  To install this certificate that 
has been obtained via the enrollment process, go to the Administration | Certificate 
Management, Figure 76, and select the hotlink “Click here to install certificate”.  This 
provides access to the Administration | Certificate Management | Install certificate 




Figure 84.   Concentrator Certificate Management Install Certificate 
 
Clicking on the “view” hotlink under “Actions”, the user can see that the status 
of the certificate shows “In Progress”, Figure 85.  Note that the identity certificate has 




Figure 85.   Concentrator Certificate Management Delete Enrollment Request 
 
Once an identity certificate was generated and put on a floppy disc by the 
NCMS the user would need to upload the identity certificate.  This is similar to how 
the CA certificate was uploaded.  Under actions, click “Install” and the 3005 will 
require input.  The user can cut and paste in information, or can get the information 
from a file.  However, instead of doing this for a CA certificate as was done 
previously, the user is now doing it for the identity certificate, i.e. using the 





Figure 86.   Concentrator Certificate Management Install Identity Certificate 
 
In Figure 86, select “Upload File From Workstation” and similar to what was 
accomplished in the CA Certificate screen, Figure 75, find the id.cer certificate and 
install it. 
Going back to the Administration | Certificate Management screen, Figure 70, 
both the CA Certificate and the identity certificate would now show installed. 
The 3005 is now configured to using Certificates. 
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Using the Certificates in the VPN 3005 Concentrator 
There are two places in the 3005 that require adjustments in order to switch 
from the use of pre-shared secret authentication to the use of certificates.  The first is 
the Configuration | Policy Management | Traffic Management | Security Associations | 




Figure 87.   Concentrator Certificate Usage: IKE Security Association 
 
In Figure 87, under IKE Parameters, Digital Certificates, instead of selecting 
“None - Use Pre-Shared Key” as was done in Figure 68, select the identity certificate 
which was created and will now be present in the drop down list. 
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The second screen that requires changes is the Configuration | System | 





Figure 88.   Concentrator Certificate Usage: IPSec Security Association 
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In the upper portion Figure 88, there is another reference to Digital 
Certificates.  The user would select the identity certificate from the drop down list. 
E. SPLIT TUNNELING 
Split tunneling is a configuration of a VPN where traffic to the VPN peer is 
sent encrypted through the tunnel, yet traffic that is not destined for the VPN peer is 
sent in the clear outside of the tunnel.    
Before the exercise, split tunneling needs to be enabled.  Traffic destined for 
the cyber-exercise opponent’s network goes through the VPN tunnel, yet other traffic 
is left alone to reach its destination as if the VPN was not in place.  This allows cyber-
exercise participants to send and receive e-mail, and access the Internet outside the 
tunnel in order to update drivers and continue to patch their systems.  Split tunneling 
also allows traffic to flow through the tunnel in order to test VPN connectivity prior to 
the start of the exercise.  
During the exercise, split tunneling must be disabled.  Traffic from the network 
behind the cyber-exercise VPN gateway that is not destined for the VPN peer is 
blocked.  This will ensure that non participating network nodes are not exposed to any 
of the exercise traffic.  
In the split tunneling examples that follow, private address space is used on 
this sample network.  Instructions using both the CLI and the SDM demonstrate the 
commands to enable and disable split tunneling.  The reader may realize that, in the 
example that follows, the cyber-exercise network uses private address space (identified 
in the IETF’s RFC1918, e.g.10.1.1.5 or 192.168.0.251).  Though private address space 
would  allow exercise participants to send traffic to the Internet, return traffic will not 
routed back, as routers will not forward to a private address space.  In order to ensure 
that the cyber-exercise private address space is able to communicate with the Internet, 
the VPN gateway router would need to implement network address translation (NAT).  
NAT provides one or more public IP addresses to be mapped to private/internal IP 
addresses as packets traverse the NAT device (usually a router) going to/from the 
private and public networks that are on either side. This allows the network of private 
IP space addresses behind the VPN gateway to access the Internet, so long as split 
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tunneling is enabled.  Using the commands below would allow the enabling and 
disabling of split tunneling on the cyber-exercise network that is using NAT. [TAN02] 
1. Split Tunneling Router to Router Using CLI 
Per the instructions in Table 14, the VPN tunnel is already in place.  In effect, a 
split tunnel condition exists.  This is the pre-cyber-exercise state.  However for the 
cyber-exercise state, all other traffic must be blocked.  This is done via an Access 
Control List (ACL). 
The following commands in Table 25 must be executed. 
 
BNP_VPN(config)#access-list 120 permit ip 
10.1.1.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 Creates the first rule in ACL 120.  Permits IP traffic from the BNP network to the U of C 
network. 
BNP_VPN(config)#int f0/0 Switched to the interface configuration 
mode. 
BNP_VPN(config-if)#ip access-group 120 in Applies ACL 120 to the FastEthernet 0/0 
interface for traffic traveling inbound to the 
router, i.e. traffic coming from the BNP 
network (10.1.1.0) 
Table 25. Router CLI: Disabling the Split Tunnel via ACL 
 
To implement a split tunnel condition, it is necessary to disassociate ACL 120 
with the Interface using the commands shown in Table 26. 
  
BNP_VPN(config)#int f0/0 Switched to the interface configuration 
mode. 
BNP_VPN(config-if)#no ip access-group 120 in The “no” command disassociates the ACL. 
Table 26. Router CLI: Enabling the Split Tunnel 
 
2. Split Tunneling Router to Router using SDM 
Similar to the CLI steps in Tables 25 and 26, in order to take the router from a 
pre-cyber-exercise (split tunnel enabled) state where it is now to block all other traffic, 
the user needs to create an Access List.  




Figure 89.   Router SDM: Access Rules 
Click “Add” 
In Figure 90, enter the Name, Type, and Rule Description: 
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Figure 90.   Router SDM ACL: Add a Rule 
 
Click “Add”.  Set up this first part of the rule to allow traffic from the local 
network to the peer network.  This can be noted in the description: 
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Figure 91.   Router SDM ACL: Extended Rule Entry 
 
In Figure 91, click “OK”.  The first part of the rule has been added.  Similar to 
the CLI, there is another part to the rule, consisting of blocking all other traffic. 
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Figure 92.   Router SDM ACL: Rule Added 
 
In Figure 92, click “Add”.  Set up this second part of the rule to block all other 
traffic.  This can be noted in the description.  Notice that “Any IP Address” is a Cisco 
default selection under “Type” in Figure 93. 
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Figure 93.   Router SDM ACL: Add an Extended Rule Entry 
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Click “OK”.  Now the second part of the rule has been added, as shown in Figure 94.  
 
Figure 94.   Router SDM ACL: Rule Added 
 




Figure 95.   Router SDM ACL: Associate Rule with Interface 
 
In Figure 95, select an Interface, in this case f0/0, and the direction, “Inbound” 
(i.e. inbound to the router).  Click “OK”. 
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Figure 97.   Router SDM ACL: Rule Added 
 
The rule is in place.  In Figure 97, click the “Deliver” icon in the top menu bar 
to send the commands to the router. 
3. Split Tunneling with Cisco 3005 Concentrator 
The two primary applications of VPNs are using the technology to securely 
connect two or more LANs, and using the technology to allow a secure remote 
extension of a LAN to remote dial-in users.  After much research into the capabilities 
of the 3005, it becomes apparent why Cisco decided to name the device a “VPN 
Concentrator”.   
Previously, if a corporation needed many users to connect from remote 
locations to its headquarters, the standard solution was to use a bank of modems.  
However, with the advent of VPN technology, this same corporation can “concentrate” 
the access point of all users via one Cisco VPN “Concentrator”. 
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It naturally follows that the remote dial-in capabilities of the Cisco VPN 
concentrator are very robust.  In fact, the 3005 can service up to 100 users at once via 
separate tunnels.  [CIS04]  Since the 3005 is specialized particularly to support the 
remote user dial-in VPN model, it would follow that the concentrator’s support for 
LAN-to-LAN VPN functionality is less robust.  Research within two separate Cisco 
books [MAS99, MAS02] dealing with the LAN-to-LAN and the dial-up configuration 
of the Cisco VPN concentrator revealed split tunneling instructions for dial-up users.  
However neither book had examples or instructions for LAN-to-LAN split tunneling 
using the VPN Concentrator.   
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined three VPN alternatives.  Detailed steps to build a 
functioning VPN have been shown, as well as the use of digital certificates and the 
implementation of split tunneling.  In Chapter VI, a close look will be taken at all 
theoretical and practical topics discussed so far, resulting in the recommendation of an 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS 
This thesis has examined the complex technology that goes into building a 
virtual private network (VPN).  Realizing the need to hone cyber-attack and defend 
skills, frequent cyber-exercises between universities is one the best ways to 
accomplish this goal.  The creation of a VPN is the preferred method to link the 
networks that participate in these cyber-exercises.  VPN creation has been the subject 
of this thesis. 
1. Technology 
The technology that goes into the understanding and building of a VPN is 
complex.  All aspects of internet protocol security (IPSec) must be carefully 
considered.  The internet key exchange (IKE) parameters, the authentication header 
(AH) and encapsulating security payload (ESP) security protocols, the tunnel and 
transport security modes, encryption and hash algorithms, and proper selection of the 
VPN endpoint devices methods must be understood, evaluated, and carefully chosen in 
order to ensure that all user requirements are met.   
2. Benefits 
If carefully selected and properly implemented, a VPN is the preferred method 
to provide a secure and reliable link between participating networks.  Depending on 
the needs of the users, VPNs can be tailored to run from gateway to gateway, or from 
host to host.  VPNs can be created on almost any budget.  VPNs can be designed to 
provide confidentiality, and/or integrity and authenticity. VPNs can be integrated with 
public key infrastructure (PKI) digital certificates if needed, or can operate using pre-
shared secret keys.  Finally, VPNs can be custom configured to balance security 
strength against efficiency and speed.  The ultimate result of careful configuration, 
selection, and implementation of a VPN is that cyber-warriors can effectively isolate 
their exercise traffic from the public Internet infrastructure that it traverses.   
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B. CYBER-EXERCISE REQUIREMENTS 
Ideally, cyber-warriors require a VPN that provides a balance of security and 
efficiency, can be easily set up and maintained, and whose hardware falls within their 
budget.  All aspects discussed so far, including VPN layer choice, security mode and 
protocol, encryption and hash algorithms, key management, and endpoint devices must 
be considered.  Each of these items are addressed below. 
1. Layer 
After careful consideration of all possibilities, the ideal location for a VPN to 
link LAN-to-LAN cyber-exercise participants is Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
layer 3, the network layer.  As examined in Chapter II, a layer 2 (data link layer) VPN 
exacts an overhead in header processing that is unnecessary for networks that are 
directly connected to the Internet, and a layer 5 (application layer) VPN is inadequate 
because it cannot encapsulate every application that may be utilized in a cyber-
exercise.  Building an internet protocol security (IPSec) layer 3 VPN allows a cyber-
exercise to take advantage of the potential broadband speed of a LAN-to-LAN 
connection over the Internet, as well as to take advantage of the many security choices 
that can be tailored within the IPSec protocol. 
2. Security Mode 
After consideration of the two modes, tunnel and transport, the only logical 
choice is the tunnel mode.  Tunnel mode allows cyber-exercises to be conducted 
gateway-to-gateway, also referred to as LAN-to-LAN.  If transport mode were 
utilized, the cyber-exercise could only be conducted from one host to one host.  This 
host-to-host connection would not meet the multi-host needs of a realistic cyber-
exercise. 
3. Security Protocol 
After consideration of the two protocols, encapsulating security payload (ESP) 
and authentication header (AH), the only logical choice is the ESP.  ESP supports 
encryption which will provide the required confidentiality.  If AH were used, only 
integrity, authentication, and replay protection would be provided for traffic.  As was 
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demonstrated with Ethereal, without encryption, exercise traffic would traverse public 
network infrastructure in the clear. 
4. Encryption Algorithm 
The advantages and disadvantages of the data encryption standard (DES) and 
the advanced encryption standard (AES) encryption algorithms were considered.  
Potentially, a cyber-exercise participant may only be able to afford a low end device as 
a VPN gateway.  This device may not be very efficient when conducting encryption.  
Coupled with the knowledge that cyber-exercises do not require extremely robust 
encryption to provide confidentiality for the exercise traffic, the optimal algorithm to 
use for a cyber-exercise would be AES128.  More secure and faster than DES, 
AES128 provides a good balance between the security desired for a cyber-exercise and 
algorithm performance. 
5. Hash Algorithm 
The advantages and disadvantages of the Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1) 
and Message Digest 5 (MD5) hash algorithms were considered.  In a similar thought 
process as used in choosing the encryption algorithm, a cyber-exercise participant’s 
VPN gateway may not be very capable.  Coupled with the knowledge that cyber-
exercises do not require the most robust hash algorithm, the optimal hash algorithm to 
use for a cyber-exercise would be MD5.  MD5, generating a 128-bit hash, will provide 
a good balance between sufficient packet integrity and system performance. 
6. Key Management 
After considering the pros and cons of key management, to include use of  pre-
shared secrets versus digital certificates, and the choice between a static key and 
dynamic re-keying, a static key exchanged out of band was deemed the preferred 
choice.  The static key, if properly entered into both VPN peers, provides adequate 
security for the exercise, obviates the overhead involved when conducting periodic re-
keying, and side-steps the poorly supported certificate validation issue that plagues 
public key infrastructure (PKI) implementations.  
7. Endpoint Devices 
Through consideration of price, complexity, and overall suitability of the three 
choices: the VPN Concentrator, the VPN-capable router, and the general purpose 
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computer running open source VPN software; it was decided that the ideal gateway 
device was the VPN-capable router using the security device manager (SDM) 
graphical user interface (GUI).   
The VPN-capable router using the SDM GUI interface is superior to the VPN 
Concentrator for linking cyber-exercises via LAN-to-LAN connectivity.  First, many 
potential cyber-exercise organizations already own a router that is either VPN-capable 
or can undergo an internetwork operating system (IOS) upgrade to allow VPN 
functionality.  Second, router configuration is an area where many cyber-exercise 
participants already have expertise.  Configuration of the router, with a VPN, would be 
familiar, straightforward, and quick.  Last, the VPN-capable router can take advantage 
of all aspects of a VPN including LAN-to-LAN split tunneling.   
8. Recommended Solution 
The optimal VPN solution for cyber-exercises is shown in Table 27. 
IKE Policy 
   Encryption: AES128 
   Hash: MD5 
   Authentication: Pre-Share 
IPSec Transform Set 
   Mode: ESP, Tunnel 
   Encryption: AES128 
   Authentication: MD5_HMAC 
Table 27. Optimal VPN Solution For Cyber-Exercises 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
1. Open Source VPNs 
With the discontinuation of support for FreeS/WAN, follow-on work could be 
completed investigating other open-source standards for constructing software-based 
VPNs that can run on general purpose computers. Then, one or more of these open 
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source products could be selected to build a VPN, possibly using the Linux or Sun 
operating systems (OSs).  These VPNs could be compared for efficiency and 
interoperability with each other. Finally, the compatibility of an open-source VPN 
with a Cisco VPN device could be examined. 
2. VPN Performance 
This thesis looked at the ease of use and theoretical concerns of choosing a 
VPN for a cyber-exercise.  NPS owns a packet generator.  Follow-on work could be 
completed constructing VPNs using Cisco devices and combinations of tunnel / 
transport mode, AH / ESP protocols, and integrating the packet generator to test and 
compare the performance and efficiency of these VPNs.  This would provide an 
alternative metric to those used in this thesis for determining the ideal VPN for a 
cyber-exercise. 
3. Integration of the NPS CA 
Recent work at NPS resulted in the building of a certificate authority (CA) 
using the Netscape Certificate Management System (NCMS) on a Sun workstation.  
[KEL04]  Follow-on work could be conducted that would involve the complete online 
integration of the NCMS system with the Bastion Network Project.  A second network 
could be constructed in the Bastion Network Project spaces and a separate NCMS 
could be built and integrated so the VPN connecting the two networks would use 
NCMS-generated certificates for authentication.  Alternately, one CA could be built 
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